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INTRODUCTION

Over forty years ago, a renewed focus on crime victim rights began to emerge in
this country. During the following years, every state enacted legislative provisions
addressing crime victim rights and a majority of states adopted constitutional provisions
concerning victim rights. Congress enacted several laws addressing aspects of crime
victim rights, but efforts to initiate a federal constitutional amendment regarding crime
victim rights proved unsuccessful.' In 2004, following another unsuccessful constitutional
amendment effort, Congress enacted the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") to
strengthen and expand crime victim rights in the federal criminal justice system and to
serve as a model for state criminal justice systems. Unlike past federal crime victimrelated statutory enactments, the CVRA was designed to bring together the "critical
components [of] rights, remedies, and resources."2
Included in the CVRA enforcement mechanisms is the authority for a crime
victim, or the prosecutor on the victim's behalf, to petition the applicable court of appeals
for a writ of mandamus if a trial judge denies relief to the victim pursuant to the CVRA.3
In the ten years since the enactment of the CVRA, petitioners have filed over 70
mandamus petitions pursuant to the statute. The appellate courts have denied or dismissed
the majority of these petitions.4 In resolving the mandamus petitions, the federal appellate
circuits have adopted a variety of review standards, resulting in a clear conflict among the
circuits in the interpretation of this aspect of the CVRA.
This Article examines the legislative history of the CVRA mandamus provision,
and the varied review standards that the federal appellate courts have adopted to resolve
CVRA mandamus petitions.6 It also analyzes the issues raised and outcomes in the CVRA
mandamus petitions reviewed thus far.7 Finally, the Article discusses the impact-or lack
thereof-that the differing review standards have had on the outcomes of the mandamus
petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA.8
'See generally PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 5-13 (2d ed. 2010).

See id. at 12; see also 150 CONG. REc. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein); 150 CONG. REC. S4,266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). The CVRA, formally
designated as the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims' Rights Act, was included as Title I in the Justice for All Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a),
118 Stat. 2260, 2261-63 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West Pamp. 2014)).
3See
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(1), (d)(3).
4 See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; infra notes 193-428 and accompanying text (discussing CVRA
petitions and outcomes).
See infra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the review standards).
See infra notes 9-32, 46-192 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-428 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 429-64 and accompanying text. It is not the purpose of this Article to assess which of the
appellate circuits has "correctly" interpreted the CVRA mandamus review provisions. Cf Crime Victims Rights
Act of2004: HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security ofthe H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46-47, 49-50 (2009) (testimony and statement of Douglas E. Beloof, Professor of Law,
Lewis and Clark Law School); 157 CONG. REC. S7,359-60 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2011) (letter of Assistant Attorney
General Ronald Weich discussing, in part, the CVRA mandamus review standard); 157 CONG. REc. S3,607-09
(daily ed. June 8, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl discussing, in part, the CVRA mandamus review standard); David
E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The FederalCrime Victims'Rights Act of2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623,
664-65, 668-72 (2008); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in FederalAppellate Courts: The Need to
Broadly Construe the Crime Victims' RightsAct's Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 599 (2010); Paul
G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System ofPublic Prosecution:A Response
to the Critics ofthe Crime Victims Rights'Act, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2011); Jon Kyl et al., On the
Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims Rights' Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 618-20 (2005); Steven Joffee, Note, Validating
Victims: Enforcing Victims'Rights through MandatoryMandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 241; Julie Kaster, Note,
2
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CONGRESS ADOPTS THE CVRA MANDAMUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
More than twenty years before the enactment of the CVRA, Congress began

enacting significant crime victim-related legislation, including provisions addressing
victim restitution and compensation and aspects of victim participation in criminal justice
proceedings (e.g., inclusion of victim impact statements in presentencing information). 9
Included in this legislation is the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 in which
Congress codified a statutory list of rights for federal crime victims. 10 Pursuant to this
legislation, officers and employees of federal agencies and departments involved in the
"detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that
victims of crime are accorded" the seven rights identified in the statute: 1) to notice of
court proceedings; 2) to confer with the prosecutor; 3) to be present at public court
proceedings regarding the crime (subject to potential limitations); 4) to reasonable
protection from the accused; 5) to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy; 6) to restitution; and 7) to information about the offender's
conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release." This statute required only "best
efforts" to provide the enumerated rights and contained no enforcement mechanism.12
When Congress repealed this victim rights provision and replaced it with the
CVRA provisions in 2004, it not only expanded the statutory list of federal crime victim
rights, but also added enforcement provisions designed to ensure the rights. 13 The federal
crime victim rights provided by the CVRA are:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public
court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or
of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence,
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered
if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.

The Voices of Victims: Debating the Appropriate Role of Fraud Victim Allocution Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1682, 1690-1702 (2010); Danielle Levine, Note and Comment, Public Wrongs and
Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's Role in a System ofPublic Prosecution, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 335 (2010)
(discussing the CVRA mandamus review standard). Ultimately, either Congress or the United States Supreme
Court must resolve the conflict in interpretation that has developed. The focus of this Article is to identify the
nature of the conflict in the circuits that has developed, analyze the outcomes in CVRA mandamus cases
reviewed thus far, and discuss any impact that the interpretation conflict may have had on the outcomes of these
CVRA mandamus petitions.
9 See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 11-12. See generally U.S. GOvT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIME
VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT: INCREASING AwARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS, AND ENHANCING

COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT 14-17, 113-16 (2008) (describing
federal victim-related legislation).
"0 See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 502, 104 Stat. 4789, 4820 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10606, repealedby Pub.
L. No. 108-405, § 102(c), 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004)). This legislation also contained a provision identifying
required services to federal crime victims, including notification of specified prosecution proceedings and postconviction events and information regarding available assistance. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 503, 104 Stat.
4789, 4820-22 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607 (West 2013)).
" 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004).
12 id.
1

Compare 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3771 (West Pamp. 2014), with 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004).
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(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government
in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy. 1 4
Unlike the predecessor victim rights statute, Congress also included a definition of the
"crime victim" eligible to assert the CVRA victim rights, i.e., a "person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the
District of Columbia." 15 Designated representatives can assert CVRA rights on behalf of
crime victims who are minors, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased. 1 6
When the CVRA was introduced in Congress, Senator Dianne Feinstein, one of
its primary co-sponsors, articulated the importance of the CVRA's enforcement
provisions:
We have written a bill that we believe is broad. We have written a
bill that provides an enforcement remedy: namely, the writ of
mandamus.
This part of the bill is what makes this legislation so important, and
different from earlier legislation: It provides mechanisms to enforce the
set of rights provided to victims of crime.
These mechanisms fall into four categories:
A direction to our courts that they "shall ensure that the crime
victim is afforded the rights described in the law."
A direction to the Attorney General of the United States to take
steps to ensure that our Federal prosecutors "make their best
efforts" to see that crime victims are aware of, and can exercise
these rights.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a); cf S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (reflecting articulation
of these rights in the underlying bills, as initially introduced in each chamber of Congress). By comparison, the
victim rights constitutional amendment that was under consideration at the time of the CVRA's enactment
provided the following rights:
14

the right to reasonable and timely notice of any public proceeding involving the crime and
of any release or escape of the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public
proceeding and reasonably to be heard at public release, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and
pardon proceedings; and the right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim's
safety, interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and just and timely claims to restitution
from the offender.
S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 48, 108th Cong. (2003); see S. REP. No. 108-191, at 33-41 (2003).
" Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e), with 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004). Although there was no crime victim
definition in the previous victim rights statute, the accompanying victim services provision defined "victim" for
purposes of that section as a "person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of
the commission of a crime." 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607(e). By comparison, the victim rights constitutional amendment
that was under consideration at the time of the CVRA's enactment was limited to victims of "violent crime." See
S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 48, 108th Cong. (2003); S. REP. No. 108-191, at 30-32 (2003).

" 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e);

cf 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607.
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A specific statement that the victim of a crime, or their
representative, may assert these rights; the result is that, for the first
time victims will have clear standing to ask our courts to enforce
their rights.
And a new use of a very old procedure, the writ of mandamus.
This provision will establish a procedure where a crime victim can,
in essence, immediately appeal a denial of their rights by a trial
court to the court of appeals, which must rule "forthwith." Simply
put, the mandamus procedure allows an appellate court to take
timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule of law set
out in this statute.

These procedures, taken together, will ensure that the rights defined
in the first section are not simply words on paper, but are meaningful
and functional.1 7
Senator Feinstein subsequently engaged in a colloquy on the Senate floor regarding the
mandamus provision with Senator Jon Kyl, the other primary co-sponsor of the
legislation:
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. ...

I now want to turn to another critical aspect of

enforcement of victims' rights, section 2, subsection (d)(3). This
subsection provides that a crime victim who is denied any of his or her
rights as a crime victim has standing to appellate review of that denial.
Specifically, the provision allows a crime victim to apply for a writ of
mandamus to the appropriate appellate court. The provision provides
that court shall take the writ and shall order the relief necessary to
protect the crime victim's right. This provision is critical for a couple of
reasons. First, it gives the victim standing to appear before the appellate
courts of this country and ask for review of a possible error below.
Second, while mandamus is generally discretionary, this provision
means that courts must review these cases. Appellate review of denials
of victims' rights is just as important as the initial assertion of a victim's
right. This provision ensures review and encourages courts to broadly
defend the victims' rights.
Mr. President, does Senator KYL agree?
Mr. KYL. Absolutely. Without the right to seek appellate review
and a guarantee that the appellate court will hear the appeal and order
relief, a victim is left to the mercy of the very trial court that may have
erred. This country's appellate courts are designed to remedy errors of
lower courts and this provision requires them to do so for victim's
rights. For a victim's right to truly be honored, a victim must be able to
assert the rights in trial courts, to then be able to have denials of those
rights reviewed at the appellate level, and to have the appellate court
take the appeal and order relief. By providing for all of this, this bill
ensures that victims' rights will have meaning.

150 CONG. REC. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see S. 2329, 108th
Cong. (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
" 150 CONG. REc. S4,270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Jon Kyl); see also
150 CONG. REc. S4,271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); 150 CONG. REC. S4,230
(daily ed. Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (referencing the inclusion of the mandamus
enforcement mechanism in the proposed legislation).
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The mandamus provision, as introduced in the Senate and as passed there with
almost no opposition, stated:
If a Federal court denies any right of a crime victim under this chapter or
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government or the
crime victim may apply for a writ of mandamus to the appropriate court
of appeals. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such
application forthwith and shall order such relief as may be necessary to
protect the crime victim's ability to exercise the rights.19
The proposed Senate legislation also authorized the Government, in any appeal in a case,
to assert as error the trial court's denial of any crime victim's right in the underlying
criminal proceeding.20
After passage in the Senate, the House of Representatives included the crime
victim rights provisions in a broader piece of legislation. 21 Without specifically
articulating their rationale, the chamber's sponsors made some slight revisions to the
mandamus provisions in their introduced version of the proposed legislation: 2 2
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide such motion
forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of
appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to
circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of
appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72
hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be
stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five day [sic], or affect
the defendant's right to a speedy trial, for purposes of enforcing this
chapter.23
In addition to the mandamus procedure, the House of Representatives retained the
additional option in the Senate bill for the Government to assert a trial court's denial of a
victim's right as error in a criminal appeal in the underlying case.2 4 On the other hand, the
House of Representatives version of the bill preserved or expanded some Senate
limitations on remedies regarding victim rights violations, including prohibition of a cause

S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); see 150 CONG. REc. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (reflecting text of the bill
and 96 favorable votes, 1 unfavorable vote, and 3 members not voting).
20 S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
21 See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-63 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771).
22 See H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 10 (2004); id. at 122-24 (statements of Rep.
James Sensenbrenner).
23
H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004); see 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill); see also 150 CONG. REc. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. James
Sensenbrenner).
24 See H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004); see 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill).
19
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of action for damages or grounds for a new trial. 2 5 The House of Representatives bill also
stated that none of its provisions should be construed to impair prosecutorial discretion.2 6
Prior to passage in the House of Representatives, Representative James
Sensenbrenner, the bill's manager, offered some amendments to the mandamus provision:
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide any motion
asserting a victim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief
sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a
single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such
application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In
no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more
than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of
appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be
27
clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
In his remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives, and consistent with the
legislation's provision that both the crime victim and the prosecutor may assert the
specified victim rights, Representative Sensenbrenner stated that the crime victim or the
Government can pursue the writ of mandamus remedy to "ensure that the crime victim's
rights are protected." 28 In addition to the mandamus amendment, Representative
Sensenbrenner proposed an amendment that would permit a crime victim to move to reopen a plea or sentence if 1) the victim had asserted a right to be heard before or during
the plea or sentencing proceeding and this right was denied; 2) the victim petitioned the
appellate court for a writ of mandamus within ten days; and 3) the accused had not entered
a plea to the highest offense charged. 29
The CVRA, as amended in the House of Representatives, was overwhelmingly
passed in the House of Representatives 30 and subsequently passed in the Senate by
31
unanimous consent. President George Bush signed the CVRA into law on October 30,
2004.32
Compare H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004), and 150 CONG. REC. H8,180
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill), with S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004), and 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed.
Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
26 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill).
27 Compare 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill as introduced), with 150 CONG. REC.
H8,195 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (amendments offered by Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
28 150 CONG. REC. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); see 150 CONG.
REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill as introduced).
29 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,195 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (amendments offered by Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
After enactment of the CVRA, the time period in which the crime victim must seek mandamus relief was
amended and extended to 14 days. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1(d)(5) (West Pamp. 2014).
30 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,204, H8,208-09 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (reflecting 393 favorable votes,
14
unfavorable votes, and 25 members not voting). See generally All Actions: H.R. 5107 108th Congress (20032004),
CONGRESs.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/5107/all-actions-withamendments (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
31
See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-17 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004). Senator JonKyl, one of the CVRA's primary Senate
co-sponsors, offered additional remarks about the CVRA provisions similar to those he and Senator Dianne
Feinstein made when the CVRA was introduced, including statements regarding the importance of the
mandamus and direct appeal by the Government provisions. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-13 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
25
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THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

ADOPT CVRA

MANDAMUS

REVIEW

STANDARDS

A.

Writ of Mandamus GeneralPrinciples

The writ of mandamus is part of the common law heritage that shaped American
jurisprudence.3 3 In its landmark decision addressing the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
Marbury v.

Madison, 34 the United

States

Supreme

Court (the

"Court")

quoted

Blackstone's mandamus definition:
a command issued in the King's name from the court of King's Bench,
and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature
within the King's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing
therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which
the court of King's Bench has previously determined, or at least
supposed, to be consonant to right and justice. 35
In considering its authority to issue the requested writ of mandamus, the Marbury Court
also noted that "to render the mandamus a proper remedy," the person to whom the writ is
directed must be a legally appropriate subject of the writ and the person seeking the writ
must be "without any other specific and legal remedy."3 6 Further, the propriety of the
issuance of the writ is determined by the "nature of the thing to be done. "3 For example,
the Court noted that mandamus would not be an appropriate remedy regarding acts
pursuant to executive discretion.38
Over one hundred years after Marbury, the Court reviewed its mandamus
jurisprudence in Roche v. EvaporatedMilk Association.39 In determining that the federal

appellate court had improperly issued a writ of mandamus, the Roche Court noted that the
"traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the
federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." 40 The
Court further noted that the function of mandamus is to correct "an abuse of judicial
power, or refusal to exercise it." 41 Finally, because "common law writs, like equitable
remedies, may be granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the court," the Court's
review of the lower court's issuance of the writ focused not on its "power to grant the writ
but whether in the light of all the circumstances the case was an appropriate one for the
exercise of that power."42

2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, including described remarks); cf 150 CONG. REC. S4,261-70 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein).
32 See AllActions: H.R. 5107, supra note 30.
3 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New FederalCircuitMandamus,45 IND. L. REv. 343, 351-61 (2012).
34 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 168 (quoting 3 WWLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 110).
3 Id. at 169.
3 Id at 170.
38
Id. at 170-71.
39319
U.S. 21, 22 (1943).
40 Id. at 26.
41
Id. at 31.
42 Id. at 25-26.
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Over fifty years later, and during Congress's consideration of the CVRA, the
Court again reviewed its mandamus jurisprudence in Cheney v. United States District
Court.43 The Cheney Court quoted prior Court statements that the "extraordinary remedy"

of the mandamus writ is justified only in "exceptional circumstances amounting to a
judicial 'usurpation of power' or a "clear abuse of discretion." 44 The Cheney Court then
summarized the requirements, previously articulated by the Court, for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus:

As the writ is one of "the most potent weapons in the judicial
arsenal," three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. First,
"the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate
means to attain the relief he desires," - a condition designed to ensure
that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy 'the burden of showing that
[his] right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable."' Third,
even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the
exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate
under the circumstances. 45
B.

Federal Courts of Appeals Diverge in Their Adoption of CVRA Mandamus
Review Standards

It is in the context of the above-described long-standing Court mandamus
jurisprudence and the previously described articulation by its two primary Senate sponsors
of the goals of the CVRA mandamus remedy that the federal appellate courts have
announced their CVRA mandamus review standards.4 6 The initial appellate circuits that
adopted CVRA mandamus review standards departed, to varying degrees, from the
traditional mandamus review standards described above. However, the majority of
appellate circuits that have adopted CVRA mandamus review standards have adopted
some variation of the traditional mandamus standards in reviewing CVRA mandamus
542 U.S. 367 (2004).
Id at 380 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346
U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). The Court noted that the common law mandamus writ "against a lower court" was
codified, as follows: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a) (West 2006)).
45 Id at 380-81 (quoting Kerrv. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); TVill, 389 U.S. at 107; Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112 n.8 (1964); Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384; Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258, 260 (1947)).
46 See supra notes 17-18, 33-45 and accompanying text. The legislative history concerning the goals and
purposes of the CVRA mandamus remedy primarily consists of the statements offered by Senators Feinstein and
Kyl on the Senate floor. In their remarks, Senator Leahy and Representative Sensenbrenner simply referenced
the mandamus remedy as a mechanism to assert or protect the statutory victim rights. See H.R. REP. No. 108711, at 122-24 (2004) (statements of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); 150 CONG. REC. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
2004) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); 150 CONG. REC. S4,271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy); 150 CONG. REC. S4,230 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). There
had been previous hearings and reports regarding the proposed crime victim rights constitutional amendments,
but these did not address the mandamus remedy. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 108-191 (2003). There were no hearings
on the CVRA in either the Senate or the House of Representatives and no Senate committee report. The House of
Representatives committee report simply stated that the crime victim or the Government could apply to the
appellate court for a writ of mandamus to enforce the statutory victim rights if a trial court had denied a request
for "appropriate relief" See H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 5, 10 (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); 150 CONG. REC. S4,266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen.
Jon Kyl);
All Actions: S
2329
108th
Congress (2003-2004), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senate-bill/2329/all-actions-with-amendments (last visited Sept.
43
44

23, 2014).
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petitions. A few appellate circuits have not yet articulated their CVRA mandamus review
standards.4 7
1.

Initial Circuit Courts Depart, to Varying Degrees, From the Traditional
Mandamus Review Standard

Less than a year after the CVRA was enacted, the Second Circuit was the first
appellate circuit to articulate its CVRA mandamus review standard in In re W.R. Huff
Asset Management Co. 48 The Huff petitioners asserted that their CVRA rights to notice,
confer with the prosecutor, fair treatment, and restitution had been violated in connection
with a fraud proceeding.4 9 In establishing its CVRA mandamus review standard, the Huff
court first reviewed circuit precedent that required mandamus petitioners to demonstrate a
"novel and significant" legal question, the inadequacy of alternative available remedies,
and a legal issue the resolution of which would "aid in the administration of justice."so
The Second Circuit court concluded, however, that under the "plain language" of the
CVRA regarding the mandamus remedy and re-opening of a plea or sentence procedure,
Congress had "chosen" the mandamus remedy "as a mechanism by which a crime victim
may appeal" a trial court's denial of relief under the CVRA.5 1 Thus, a CVRA mandamus
petitioner "need not overcome the hurdles" of a traditional mandamus proceeding.52
The Second Circuit court stated that because CVRA crime victims, as mandamus
petitioners, "have a right to appellate review," it must determine the appropriate review
standard for these CVRA appellate proceedings.53 In this connection, the appellate court
reviewed the three traditional appellate review standards: de novo review of questions of
law, clear error review of questions of fact, and abuse of discretion review of matters
entrusted to the lower court's discretion.54 The Huff court found instructive the Court's
selection of the abuse of discretion appellate review standard in a decision concerning a
trial court's award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.5 5
Applying the rationale of the Court's attorneys' fees decision, the Second Circuit court
found that the CVRA entrusts the trial court with ensuring that crime victims are afforded
their CVRA rights.56 In addition, the trial court is in a better position than an appellate
court to determine whether CVRA relief is warranted in an individual case and to make
the determinations of "reasonableness" required regarding most of the CVRA rights.
Finally, the Huff court stated that, just as regarding the attorneys' fees case, there is not a
"clear statutory prescription" or a "historical tradition" to determine the appropriate
review standard.5 " Finding that the factors utilized by the Court in adopting the abuse of
discretion review standard in the attorneys' fees decision applied "with equal force" to the

See infra notes 48-192 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA review standards).
409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005). Most of the appellate courts' CVRA mandamus decisions have been rendered
through published and unpublished per curiam opinions or orders. Because all of these decisions are presented in
this Article for illustrative purposes, the per curiam and "unpublished" designations will not be used in the
citations of these opinions.
49 See id. at 560-61.
5o See id. at 562.
47
48

51
52

Id

id

53id

See id (referencing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)).
See id. at 562-63.
5 Id. at 562.
5
1Id. at 562-63.
58 Id. at 563.
54
5
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CVRA, the Second Circuit held that a trial court's CVRA determinations should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion and found no abuse of discretion in the instant case. 59
In In re Galvis, 60 the Second Circuit subsequently expanded its CVRA
mandamus review standards in reviewing a trial court's determination that the petitioner
was not an eligible "crime victim" under the CVRA. 61 The Galvis court retained the Huff
standard that a trial court's CVRA determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion in
the mandamus process.62 However, the Second Circuit court also determined that the
appellate court reviews for "clear error any factual findings made by the district court in
determining a putative victim's motion to enforce her [CVRA] rights." 63 In adding this
CVRA mandamus review standard, the Galvis court quoted a previous Court decision
regarding the interrelationship of the abuse of discretion and clear error review standards:
"When an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse-ofdiscretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable. A court of appeals would
be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual
finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous." 64 The Galvis court denied the
mandamus petition, concluding that there was no clear error in the trial court's
determination of the facts concerning the petitioner's CVRA victim status and therefore
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to assert CVRA rights. 65
The Ninth Circuit announced its CVRA mandamus review standard regarding a
petition alleging a denial of the crime victim's right to be orally heard at sentencing in
Kenna v. United States District Court,66 issued a few months after the Second Circuit's

Huff decision. The Kenna court noted the usual circuit application of "strict standards" in
mandamus review, granting the writ only in "truly extraordinary" cases, such as those
involving clear or frequently repeated legal error, absence of alternative review
67
mechanisms, or issues of first impression. The appellate court further stated that the
instant case may warrant review under the circuit's traditional mandamus standards.68
However, the Ninth Circuit court stated that the application of the circuit's
traditional mandamus factors was not required because the "CVRA contemplates active
review of orders denying victims' rights claims even in routine cases. . . The CVRA
[mandamus provisions create] a unique regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine
interlocutory review of district court decisions denying rights asserted under the statute." 69
In agreement with the Second Circuit's decision in Huff and in the absence of any contrary
appellate decisions, the Ninth Circuit court stated that "we must issue the writ [in CVRA
mandamus proceedings] whenever we find that the district court's order reflects an abuse
of discretion or legal error." 70 Finding that the trial court clearly erred in declining to
permit the petitioner to be orally heard at sentencing, the Kenna court granted the writ of

See id. at 562-64 (discussing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558-62); infra notes 254-60, 344-51 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition); see also In re Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81, 85-88 (2d Cir. 2009)
(utilizing the abuse of discretion standard to deny a CVRA mandamus petition).
6o 564 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009).
6'Id at 174-76.
62
63 Id at 174 (citing WIR. HuffAssetMgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 563).
5

id

64

Id at 174-75 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990)).
6'Id at 175-76; see infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006).
7
Id. at 1017.
68 See id (citing Baumanv. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)).
69
1
60

Id.
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mandamus to permit the petitioner to pursue a CVRA motion in the trial court to re-open
the sentencing proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit has maintained the Kenna CVRA mandamus review standard
in subsequent decisions, i.e., utilizing its abuse of discretion or legal error standard
regarding CVRA mandamus petitions rather than the circuit's traditional mandamus
balancing test. 7 2 However, in applying this review standard in In re Andrich,7 3 in which
the petitioners sought mandamus both pursuant to the CVRA and traditional mandamus,
the Ninth Circuit described the interrelationship between the Kenna CVRA mandamus
review standard and the circuit's traditional mandamus review standard.74 In establishing
its CVRA review standard, the Andrich court stated that the Kenna court (and subsequent
circuit decisions following Kenna) had focused on one of the several factors identified in
the circuit's traditional mandamus review standard, i.e., that a trial court's order is "clearly
erroneous as a matter of law," and that prior circuit precedent had determined that this
traditional factor is "dispositive" in the mandamus analysis. 75 Moreover, this circuit
precedent is consistent with the Court's mandamus jurisprudence that a petitioner's
entitlement to mandamus must be "clear and indisputable." 7 6 In the instant case, the Ninth
Circuit court found that the trial judge did not "clearly err as a matter of law, nor did he
abuse his discretion" in determining the petitioner's CVRA victim status. 77 The Andrich
court therefore denied the mandamus petition under "either the CVRA or our traditional
mandamus authority."
Slightly over a year after the Ninth Circuit announced its CVRA mandamus
review standard in Kenna, the Third Circuit, in In re Walsh,79 denied a mandamus petition
presented generally and pursuant to the CVRA.so In denying the mandamus petition
pursuant to the CVRA, the Walsh court, citing the Ninth Circuit's Kenna decision and the
Second Circuit's Huff decision, stated that "mandamus relief is available under a different,
and less demanding, standard under [the CVRA] in the appropriate circumstances." 1 The
Walsh court did not explicitly state what this "different" CVRA mandamus standard
was.82 Moreover, in reviewing a CVRA mandamus petition in In re Zackey,83 the Third
Circuit stated, "[W]e assume that Congress understood the implications of using a term of
art such as 'mandamus' when drafting the statute." 84 However, the Zackey court found it
unnecessary to decide whether to apply the traditional mandamus review standard or the
"more expansive abuse of discretion standard" to the petitioner's claim regarding the right
to be heard through his attorney. 5 The appellate court found that, even under the abuse of

' Id at 1017-18; see infra notes 364-75 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3771(d)(5)

(West Pamp. 2014) (describing the motion to re-open sentencing procedure).
See, e.g., In re K.K., 756 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2013).
7 668 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011).
74
Id. at 1051.
7 Id
See id (quoting Kerrv. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
7 Id
78 Id.; see infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
79 229 F. App'x 58 (3d Cir. 2007).
so Id at 60.
72

8 Id

See id.; accordIn re Mujaddid, 563 F. App'x 874, 875 (3d Cir. 2014); In re El, 553 F. App'x 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2014).
83 No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010).
84
Id. at *3.
85 Id
82
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discretion standard, the petitioner was not entitled to CVRA mandamus relief.8 6 Thus,
there appears to be some ambiguity in the Third Circuit's articulation of its CVRA
mandamus review standard and the degree to which it has departed from the traditional
mandamus review standard.
2.

Subsequent Circuit Courts Adopt a Traditional Mandamus Review Standard

As described above, the initial appellate circuits that addressed the CVRA
mandamus review standard, i.e., the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, interpreted the
CVRA mandamus provisions-to varying degrees-to support a mandamus review
standard less stringent than their circuits' traditional mandamus review standard. 87
However, all of the appellate circuits that have subsequently adopted a CVRA mandamus
review standard, i.e., the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits, have adopted a traditional mandamus review standard for their review of CVRA
mandamus petitions." The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted a
CVRA mandamus review standard.
The Tenth Circuit was the first appellate circuit to adopt a traditional mandamus
review standard in connection with its review of a trial court's determination of CVRA
crime victim status in In re Antrobus. 90 The Antrobus petitioners had asserted that, "even

though the CVRA provides for mandamus review, this court should apply those standards
that would apply on normal appellate review," citing the Huff and Kenna decisions.91
However, the Antrobus court "respectfully disagree[d]" with the decisions of the Second
and Ninth Circuits. 92 Applying the "plain language" of the CVRA, the Tenth Circuit court
stated that Congress "authorized and made use of the term 'mandamus' in the CVRA
rather than terms such as "immediate appellate review" or "interlocutory appellate review"
that Congress had previously used in statutes. 93 The Antrobus court cited Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of terms of art:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.

94

Finding that "[m]andamus is the subject of longstanding judicial precedent," the
Tenth Circuit court applied the above-described Court interpretive precedent to the "plain
language" of the CVRA and reviewed the petition under "traditional" mandamus
standards.9 5 The Antrobus court cited Court mandamus precedent that reflected that
mandamus is a "drastic" remedy reserved for "extraordinary situations," such as to compel
Id; see infra notes 393-99 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See supra notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90-167 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
90519 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008).
91
92 Id. at 1124.
8

id

93

Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
9 Id at 1125; see id. at 1126 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting the "relaxed" CVRA mandamus review
standards adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits and stating that the Antrobus court had "part[ed] company"
with these circuits and applied the traditional mandamus review standard).
94
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a lower court to "exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so," and requiring a
petitioner to demonstrate a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ. 96 Although
characterizing the instant petition as a "difficult case," the Antrobus court denied the writ
because it was unable to conclude that the trial court was "clearly wrong" in its victim
status determination or that the petitioners' right to mandamus was "clear and
indisputable," as required under the traditional mandamus review standard.9 7
In a subsequent CVRA mandamus proceeding involving the Antrobus petitioners,
the Tenth Circuit maintained its use of traditional mandamus review standards." In
articulating these standards, the appellate court cited additional Court precedent requiring
that a mandamus petitioner have "no other adequate means" to attain the requested relief.99
The Tenth Circuit also cited its own mandamus precedent that a petitioner's "clear and
indisputable" right to mandamus can be demonstrated by a "judicial usurpation of power
or a clear abuse of discretion."oo The Tenth Circuit declined the Antrobus petitioners'
request to apply "ordinary appellate standards of review" to the instant petition regarding
the trial court's denial of their discovery request concerning their attempt to establish their
CVRA victim status. 101 However, the appellate court stated that the review standard would
make no difference in the instant matter because the trial court's action would be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard under either review standard. 10 2 Finding no "clear
abuse of discretion" by the trial court, the Tenth Circuit denied the Antrobus mandamus
petition.103

In their subsequent petition for rehearing regarding their initial mandamus
petition, the Antrobus petitioners re-asserted their position that "normal appellate" rather
than traditional mandamus review standards should apply to their CVRA mandamus
petition. 1 0 4 Once again, in rejecting the petitioners' position, the Tenth Circuit cited the
"plain language" of the CVRA that incorporated the mandamus remedy, a "well worn
term of art in our common law tradition," and Court interpretive precedent regarding
statutory use of terms of art.10 5 The Tenth Circuit also found nothing in the Huff and
Kenna decisions-departing from the traditional mandamus review standard-that
explained Congress's use of "mandamus" rather than "appeal" in the CVRA and it found
the Huff court's reliance on the Court's attorneys' fees review standard decision
misplaced. 106
In addition to the general interpretive concept that Congress, having authorized
interlocutory appeals in other legislation, should be presumed to have intentionally
selected the mandamus remedy for use in the CVRA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
CVRA's "structure and language" supported the incorporation of traditional mandamus in
the CVRA. In this connection, the Tenth Circuit referenced the CVRA's alternative option
for the Government to assert CVRA error in an ordinary appeal from the underlying
conviction and the 72 hour time frame for CVRA mandamus decision-making that was
96

Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
Id. at 1125-26.
98 In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008).
99 Id. (quotingAllied Chem.Corp., 449 U.S. at 35).
Id at *3 (quoting In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2006)).
97

101

102

Id. at *3 n.1L

id

Id. at *12; see infra note 226 (discussing this petition).
In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008).
105 Id
at 1127-28 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 263 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170-71 (1803)).
' Id. at 1128 & n.3.
103

104
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inconsistent with typical appellate review of often complex legal issues. 107 Contrary to the
petitioners' alternative assertions, the Tenth Circuit explained that the "clear and
indisputable right" requirement that it imposed regarding CVRA mandamus petitions was
consistent with traditional mandamus circuit precedent. 1o Finally, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Antrobus petitioners had failed to "even suggest" how adopting their proposed
review standard would affect their petition's outcome.109 The Tenth Circuit denied the
Antrobus petition for rehearing, 11o and has subsequently maintained the traditional
mandamus review standard regarding CVRA mandamus petitions."
The Fifth Circuit was the next circuit to adopt traditional mandamus review
standards regarding the CVRA. In resolving the mandamus petition in In re Dean,1 12 the
appellate court stated that the parties disputed the applicable review standard.11 3 The
appellate court stated that despite the use of the term "mandamus" in the CVRA, the
petitioners asserted that "ordinary appeal standards" apply to CVRA mandamus
petitions. 114 The Dean court noted that two circuits agreed with the petitioners, citing the
Kenna and Huff decisions. However, citing the Antrobus rehearing petition decision
described above, the Dean court stated that the Tenth Circuit had recently held that
mandamus standards apply to CVRA petitions. The Fifth Circuit announced, "We are in
accord with the Tenth Circuit for the reasons stated in its opinion." 15
The Dean court then described the three-part Court mandamus standard that the
Fifth Circuit had adopted, requiring a mandamus petitioner 1) to have "no other adequate
means" to attain the requested relief and 2) to demonstrate a "clear and indisputable right"
to the writ, and 3) further requiring that the court, in exercising its discretion, concludes
the writ is "appropriate under the circumstances." 1 6 The Dean court found that the trial
court, "with the best of intentions, misapplied the law and failed to accord the victims the
rights conferred by the CVRA," i.e., the rights to notice and to confer with the
prosecutor.1 17 However, in determining whether to issue the mandamus writ, the Dean
court found that it did not need to decide whether the first two mandamus requirements
were met because "for prudential reasons, a writ of mandamus is not 'appropriate under
the circumstances' presented by the case."
The Fifth Circuit has continued to apply to CVRA mandamus petitions the
traditional three-part mandamus review standard announced in Dean.119 In an en banc

See id. at 1128-30. The Antrobus court stated that the petitioners' additional arguments regarding why they
should have greater appellate rights pursuant to the CVRA were "best directed to Congress. Our job is to apply
the CVRA as written, not to rewrite it as one might wish the law to be." Id. at 1129.
"o Id. at 1130 (stating that a multi-factor analysis sometimes used in the circuit is simply "one, non-exclusive
means of applying" the "clear and indisputable right" standard).
0 9
1 Id. at 1130-31.
"o Id. at 1131; see infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf United States v.
Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308, 1312-16 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding the CVRA did not authorize a non-party right to
appeal the underlying sentence and dismissing the Antrobus attempt to directly appeal from the defendant's
sentence).
...
See In re Olesen, 447 F. App'x 868, 869-70 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir.
2009).
112 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
3
11 Id. at 393.
114 Id. at 393-94.
1o7

115

Id.

..Id. at 394 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).
117

Id.

118

Id.; see infra notes 3 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See, e.g., In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 647-48 (5th Cir. 2011).

119
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however, the Fifth Circuit not only rejected the

petitioner's contention that the review standard governing direct criminal appeals applies
to CVRA mandamus petitions, but also more fully articulated its rationale for adopting the
traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA mandamus petitions. 121 After reviewing
the nature of the traditional mandamus writ as an "extraordinary remedy" and not a
substitute for an appeal or a mechanism to control trial court decision making in
discretionary matters, 122 the Fifth Circuit found that aspects of the CVRA supported its
conclusion that Congress intended to incorporate traditional mandamus when it adopted
the statutory "mandamus" remedy for crime victims.123

For example, the en banc court found that the CVRA's identification of an
exclusive list of crime victim rights and authorization of mandamus only when a trial
court denies a motion regarding one of these identified rights "suggests that in granting
relief, the district court retains discretion to select the appropriate means to ensure victims'
rights, and that victims may only properly seek appellate intervention where the district
court clearly fails to 'exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' 1 2 4 Moreover, the
CVRA's express limitation to the Government, in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion, of the alternative right to appeal based on a claim of CVRA-related error
further supports Congress's intentional adoption of a traditional mandamus remedy for
crime victims. The CVRA's requirement that its mandamus petitions must be resolved by
the appellate court within 72 hours and its authorization for resolution by a single
appellate judge further support Congress's adoption of a traditional mandamus remedy,
i.e., reflecting that appellate courts must "grant relief quickly, but rarely" as consistent
with a remedy reserved for "extraordinary" cases.125 Acknowledging the petitioner's
contention that "it may be more difficult for a crime victim to enforce rights through
mandamus than appeal, [the Fifth Circuit en banc court concluded] this limitation reflects
the express language of the statute and honors the common law tradition in place when the
CVRA was drafted."1 26
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Simons,127 its initial CVRA mandamus petition, noted
the conflict in the appellate circuits regarding the CVRA mandamus review standard.128
The Simons court, however, found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of the "proper"
CVRA review standard in the case because it found the petitioner had established his
"clear and indisputable" right to relief, i.e., a prompt ruling on his motion to unseal case

701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Paroline v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (determining restitution).
121 See id. at 756-58. In its en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit also held that the CVRA does not grant crime
victims an independent right to appeal from the underlying criminal proceedings. See id. at 754-56; cf id. at
758-59 (finding it unnecessary to resolve whether the appellate court's supervisory mandamus power of review
applied to the petition).
122 Id. at 757.
123 Id. at 757-58.
124 Id. at 757 (quoting Kerrv. U. S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)).
125 Id. at 757-58; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3), (4) (West Pamp. 2014).
126
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 757-58. Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the en banc court found that the
CVRA requirements that the appellate court "take up and decide" a CVRA mandamus petition and "ensure"
crime victims are afforded their rights did not support an appellate rather than a mandamus review standard. Id.
The en banc court also did not find persuasive the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits in Huffand Kenna,
respectively, regarding a non-traditional review standard, and questioned other cited circuits' support for a nontraditional mandamus standard. See id. at 758 n.6; cf infra notes 284-96 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition).
127 567 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2009).
128 Id
at 801.
120
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records. 129 He was therefore entitled to relief under the "stricter" traditional mandamus
review standard.

130

The Sixth Circuit subsequently adopted the traditional mandamus standard in In
re Acker. 131 The Sixth Circuit found "persuasive" the Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision
that concluded the CVRA's "plain language" compelled application of the "normal
mandamus standards." 1 32 Specifically, the Acker court cited the CVRA's use of the term
"mandamus" that is governed by "well-established standards" and the "truncated" review
period required for CVRA mandamus petitions as factors that "convince[d]" it that the
"usual" mandamus standards apply to CVRA petitions.133 The Acker court cited Court and
Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the requirements for the "extraordinary" remedy of
mandamus, including "exceptional circumstances amounting to a ... clear abuse of
discretion."l34 Finding no such abuse of discretion in the trial court's acceptance of a plea
agreement in the case, the appellate court denied the mandamus petition. 135 In the related
mandamus petition of In re McNulty,136 the Sixth Circuit added that, as a discretionary
remedy, mandamus can be denied if it is not "appropriate under the circumstances" even if
a petitioner has shown a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ. The McNulty court
found that the petitioner, who challenged the denial of his CVRA victim status and
restitution, had not established his "clear and indisputable" right to the writ and thus the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its determinations.137
As was the case in the Sixth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit found it
unnecessary to determine the appropriate review standard in resolving its initial CVRA
mandamus petition in In re Jacobsen.138 The Jacobsen court found that the petitioner had

not satisfied either a "clear and indisputable right" or an "abuse of discretion" review
standard regarding an alleged denial of the right to be heard and denied the petition as
moot.139 Subsequently, in In re Amy, 140 the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the
traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions. 14 1 After noting the conflict in
the circuits regarding the issue, the District of Columbia Circuit court concluded that the
"best reading" of the CVRA supports the application of the traditional mandamus
standard. 142
In support of its conclusion, the District of Columbia Circuit court cited the Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as "mandamus"; the
CVRA inclusion of the alternative direct appeal remedy solely for the Government to
assert CVRA-related errors; and the "abbreviated" deadline for resolution of CVRA

Id.
See id.; infra note 343 (discussing this petition); cf In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 608-10 (6th Cir. 2009)
(addressing an appeal and mandamus action regarding the trial court's refusal to disclose the presentence report
to crime victims for use in a civil suit following the conclusion of the criminal proceeding, and finding the
victims' request was outside the scope of the CVRA and that the trial court had not abused its discretion
regarding the appellate action).
131 596 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2010).
132 Id. (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2008)).
133 Id
134 Id.
135 Id. at 373; see infra notes 274-76, 363 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
13' 597 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010).
137 Id. at 349, 352-53; see infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
138 No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005).
139 Id. at *2-4; see infra note 406 (discussing this petition).
140 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
141 Id. at 534.
142 Id. at 532-33.
129
30

1
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mandamus petitions that is more consistent with a review for only "clear and indisputable"
errors.143 The Amy court found unpersuasive the petitioner's assertions that CVRA
statutory language that appellate courts "take up and decide" mandamus petitions and
"ensure" a victim's rights, or the statements offered on the Senate floor by Senators
Feinstein and Kyl, supported an appellate-type rather than a traditional CVRA mandamus
review standard. 144 Instead, the appellate court applied the District of Columbia Circuit's
three-part traditional mandamus review standard to the petitioner's restitution-related
claim, requiring her to demonstrate that 1) she has a "clear and indisputable right" to
relief; 2) the trial court has a "clear duty to act"; and 3) no other "adequate remedy" is
available. 145 Applying this traditional standard, the Amy court granted her mandamus
relief, in part, regarding her restitution claim. 146
In reviewing its only CVRA mandamus petition thus far, in In re Vicky, 147 the

Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to adopt the traditional mandamus review standard. In
rejecting the petitioner's request that the direct appeal review standard be applied to her
CVRA mandamus petition, the Eighth Circuit court cited aspects of the rationale utilized
by the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits in adopting the traditional
mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions. 14 The Vicky court noted the Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as mandamus; the
express provision of the alternative opportunity for direct appeal for the Government
regarding CVRA-related errors; and the short statutory time frame for the resolution of
CVRA mandamus petitions. The appellate court found that the Huff and Kenna decisions
cited by the petitioner regarding alternative review standards lacked "detailed analysis"
and were "unpersuasive" and the cited decisions of the Third and Eleventh Circuits did not
clearly adopt an alternative review standard. 149 The Eighth Circuit therefore adopted the
Court and circuit "traditional standard" for mandamus, requiring a petitioner to
demonstrate 1) the absence of an "adequate alternative means" to attain relief, 2) a "clear
and indisputable" right to the writ, and 3) that the writ is "appropriate under the
circumstances." 1 5 0 Finding that the trial court did not "clearly and indisputably" err in its
determination of restitution, the Vicky court denied the mandamus petition.15 1
The Eleventh Circuit's articulation of its CVRA mandamus review standard has
evolved over time. In In re Stewart,152 the appellate court characterized the CVRA
mandamus proceeding as a "free standing cause of action" and "not an appeal" or an
"interlocutory appeal of an intermediate order." l53 In granting the petitioners' writ
regarding their CVRA victim status, the Stewart court described the question for
resolution as a "mixed question of law and fact," but did not explicitly state the review
standard that it was applying.154 However, the basis for the dissenting opinion was that the
petitioners had failed to demonstrate the "clear and indisputable" right to the writ or the

Id. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
145 Id. at 532, 534.
146 Id. at 534-44; see infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
147 709 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other groundssub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct.
1934 (2014) (requiring further proceedings regarding restitution).
143

144

48

1

Id. at 718-719.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 718-20.
...
Id. at 719-23; see infra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
152 552 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2008).
153 Id. at 1288.
154 Id. at 1288-89; see infra notes 234-39, 400 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
149

15o
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"clear abuse of discretion" required for the "drastic and extraordinary remedy" of
mandamus. 155
When the Stewart petitioners filed a subsequent CVRA mandamus petition, in In
re Stewart,15 6 regarding the trial court's denial of restitution to them, the appellate court
noted that it "did not explicitly indicate the standard" used in resolving the initial
mandamus writ.1 '" Regarding the restitution-related petition, the Stewart court stated that
it made "no difference" whether it treated the matter as an appeal of a trial court judgment
or an original mandamus proceeding because the questions for resolution were identical,
i.e., whether the trial court's findings of fact were "clearly erroneous" or whether it had
misapplied the law to the factual findings. 1s Finding the legal principle in the case
undisputed and the trial court's factual findings not clearly erroneous, the Stewart court
denied the mandamus petition. 159
Almost ten years after the enactment of the CVRA, the Eleventh Circuit
explicitly adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard in In re Wellcare Health Plans,
Inc. 16 0 The Eleventh Circuit repeated its previous statements that the CVRA mandamus
proceeding is a "free-standing cause of action" and not an "appeal of a district court
judgment" or an "interlocutory appeal of an intermediate order." 1 6 1 The Wellcare court
noted that, in the Stewart decision, it had previously "left open" whether "traditional"
162
mandamus or "normal appellate" review standards apply to CVRA mandamus petitions.
In Wellcare, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, in accord with the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth,
and District of Columbia Circuits, the traditional mandamus review standard applied to
CVRA petitions.163 The appellate court stated that the "plain text" and other "compelling
textual clues" of the CVRA supported its conclusion: the Court interpretive precedent
regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as mandamus; the express provision of the
alternative opportunity for direct appeal for the Government regarding CVRA-related
errors; and the "compressed" statutory time frame for the resolution of CVRA mandamus
petitions that is consistent with a "highly deferential" review standard.164
Having adopted the traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions,
the appellate court noted that it is an "extraordinary remedy" to be utilized in
circumstances constituting a "judicial usurpation of power" or a "clear abuse of

See Stewart, 552 F.3d at 1290 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
380-81 (2004)).
.. 641 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).
157 Id. at 1274.
158 Id. at 1274-75.
159 Id.; see infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also In re Aquino, No. 1213238-B (11th Cir. June 22, 2012) (citing Stewart and reviewing the trial court's determination of CVRA crime
victim status for "clear error"); In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Nos. 11-12707-G, 11-12708-G (11th
Cir. June 17, 2011) (quoting Stewart and stating that in reviewing a CVRA mandamus petition, the appellate
court must determine whether the trial court based its decision on clearly erroneous factual findings or a
misapplication of the law to the findings). In In re Aquino, the appellate court found that the petitioners had not
demonstrated that the trial court made "clearly erroneous" factual findings or misapplied the law to the facts. No.
12-11757-B, slip op. at 1 (11th Cir. Apr. 06, 2012). However, it cited Stewart for the proposition that the
Eleventh Circuit had not decided whether CVRA mandamus petitions are reviewed under the "clear-abuse-ofdiscretion standard generally applicable to mandamus petitions or the less-demanding standard of review applied
to ordinary appeals" and concluded that the petitioners had not demonstrated entitlement to relief under "any
potentially applicable standard of review." Id., slip op. at 2 & n. 1.
1o754
F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237 n.3.
Id. at 1238.
155

164

See id. at 1237-38.
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discretion."1 6 5 The Eleventh Circuit also stated the Court's three-part standard a petitioner
must satisfy for the issuance of a writ, i.e., the demonstration of 1) the absence of an
adequate alternative means to attain relief, 2) a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ,
and 3) that the writ is "appropriate under the circumstances."1 6 6 In the instant case, the
Wellcare court found that the petitioner had not met its burden to demonstrate a "clear and
indisputable" right to the writ and that the trial court had not "clearly abuse[d] its
discretion" in denying the petitioner CVRA victim status or restitution. 167
3.

Remaining Circuits Have Not Yet Adopted a CVRA Mandamus Review
Standard

Over ten years after the enactment of the CVRA, three appellate circuits, i.e., the
First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, have not yet adopted a review standard regarding
CVRA mandamus petitions. Although the Seventh Circuit has denied several CVRA
mandamus petitions, it has not identified a standard of review for its actions. 16 In the sole
CVRA mandamus petition it has considered, the First Circuit simply found that the trial
court "did not err" in determining the petitioner was not a CVRA crime victim and denied
the petition in In re Haas.169 In another case in which crime victims had attempted to file
an appeal rather than a mandamus petition concerning the denial of restitution, the First
Circuit noted the conflict in the circuits regarding the applicable CVRA mandamus review
standard. 170 The appellate court further found that the victims would not be entitled to
CVRA mandamus relief under either the "exacting standard" of traditional mandamus
review or the "more lenient" abuse of discretion standard. 171 As a result, conversion of
their attempted appeal into a mandamus petition would be "futile" and the First Circuit
therefore found it unnecessary to decide the applicable CVRA mandamus review
standard.

172

The Fourth Circuit has also addressed, but not resolved, the standard of review
issue in some of its CVRA mandamus rulings. For example in In re Doe,173 the first of
these decisions, the appellate court described the traditional mandamus review standard;
observed that CVRA mandamus petitions are "not necessarily subject to this stringent"
review standard; and noted that the Second and Ninth Circuits had adopted a "normal
abuse of discretion" standard for CVRA mandamus petitions rather than the higher abuse
of discretion standard associated with mandamus petitions. 17 4 However, the Doe court
concluded that it did not need to decide the review standard issue because the petitioner
was not entitled to mandamus relief regarding her CVRA victim status and restitution
claims "even under the lower standard."1 75

. Id. at 1238 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)).
Id. (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-8 1).
' Id. at 1238-40; see infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
1 See, e.g., In re Hamilton, No. 12-1059 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2012); In re Bustos, No. 10-2752 (7th Cir. July 26,
2010); In re Sabbia, No. 10-3316, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27411 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2010); cf In re Oak Brook
Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12, 2006) (citing Kenna and Huff in connection with general statements
regarding the CVRA).
169 No. 08-2378 (1st Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
17o United States v. Aguirre-Gonzales, 597 F.3d 46, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2010).
171

Id. at 56.

Id.; see id. at 52-55 (holding that crime victims do not have a right of direct appeal pursuant to the CVRA and
that their sole appellate remedy for asserted CVRA rights violations is through the CVRA mandamus remedy).
173 264 F. App'x 260 (4th Cir. 2007).
174 Id. at 261-62.
175 See id. at 262; id. at 264 (finding no abuse of discretion); infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
172
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In In re Brock,17 6 the Fourth Circuit similarly noted the traditional mandamus

standard and the "ordinary abuse of discretion" standard adopted by the Second and Ninth
Circuits for review of CVRA mandamus petitions. 177 As in Doe, the Brock court
concluded that it did not need to decide the review standard issue because "even applying
the more relaxed abuse of discretion standard," the petitioner was not entitled to relief
regarding his claimed violations of his CVRA rights to be heard and treated fairly.178
In ruling on a CVRA mandamus petition almost ten years after the enactment of
the CVRA, in In re Bankruptcy Estate of AGTS, Inc.,1 79 the Fourth Circuit once again

declined to adopt a standard of review for use regarding CVRA mandamus petitions. 8 o
The AGS court noted the traditional mandamus review standard, as well as the conflict that
had developed among the appellate circuits regarding whether the traditional mandamus or
"traditional appeal" standard applies to the CVRA petitions. Once again, the Fourth
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the applicable review standard, stating, "It is
sufficient simply to note that to issue a writ of mandamus to a district court is not
something to be undertaken lightly.".. The AGS court found that the petitioner was not a
CVRA victim and that the trial court "did not err" in denying restitution to the petitioner,
2
and denied the petition. 18
C.

Conclusion Regarding Appellate Adoption

of CVRA

Mandamus Review

Standards

In the ten years since the enactment of the CVRA, at least eight of the twelve
federal appellate circuits have adopted review standards for the CVRA mandamus
remedy. The initial two appellate circuits to announce CVRA mandamus review standards
interpreted the CVRA to support their selection of a review standard more similar to that
used in direct appellate review than that utilized in traditional mandamus review. The
Second Circuit selected the abuse of discretion standard in Hufl 83 and the Ninth Circuit
selected an abuse of discretion or legal error standard in Kenna.18 4 The Third Circuit has
cited Huff and Kenna as authority for a "different, and less demanding"-but not
explicitly articulated-CVRA mandamus review standard. 185 However, it has also
referenced the implications of Congress's use of a term of art, such as "mandamus," in the
CVRA, in finding it unnecessary to decide the applicable review standard regarding a
CVRA mandamus petition.186 The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted
CVRA mandamus review standards. 187

262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir. 2008).
...Id. at 512.
178
179

Id. (finding no abuse of discretion); see infra notes 415-22 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
565 F. App'x 172 (4th Cir. 2014).

Id. at 174.
181 Id.
18o

Id. at 175; see infra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent Second Circuit discussion of the interrelationship between an abuse of discretion and a clear error
review in CVRA mandamus review).
184 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent Ninth Circuit discussion of the interrelationship of the Kenna review standard and traditional
mandamus review).
185 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
182
183

1

See id.

187

See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
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Six appellate circuits have interpreted the CVRA to require a traditional
mandamus review standard regarding CVRA petitions, i.e. the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. "" In this connection, the Fifth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted the three-part Court standard requiring the unavailability
of an alternative adequate means to attain relief, a clear and indisputable right to the writ,
and the appropriateness of the grant of the writ under the circumstances. 89 The Sixth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits also require a petitioner's showing of a clear and
indisputable right to the writ. The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits additionally
reference the unavailability of other adequate means to relief. The Sixth and the Tenth
Circuits state that a clear and indisputable right to the writ can be demonstrated by a
showing of a "clear" abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit also includes a showing of the
appropriateness of the requested relief under the circumstances. The District of Columbia
Circuit additionally requires a showing that the trial court has a clear duty to act. 190 Thus,
all of these circuits require a CVRA mandamus petitioner to demonstrate a clear and
indisputable right to relief, plus additional specified factors associated with the traditional
mandamus remedy, in order to obtain CVRA mandamus relief.
A conflict in the circuits has clearly developed between the majority of appellate
circuits (i.e., six circuits) that have adopted some variation of the traditional mandamus
review standard regarding CVRA petitions and the minority of circuits (i.e., two or three
circuits) that have adopted a review standard more like an ordinary appellate review
standard. Additionally, a significant minority of circuits (i.e., three or four circuits) have
not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard. 191 This conflict must await
resolution either by congressional action amending the CVRA to specify the desired
review standard for CVRA mandamus petitions or by Court action interpreting the CVRA
and resolving the existing conflict in the circuits. 1 9 2
In the meantime, however, the federal appellate courts continue to review CVRA
mandamus petitions. The next section of this Article examines the outcomes regarding the
CVRA mandamus petitions reviewed thus far and the actual impact the appellate courts'
differing review standards (or lack of review standards) have had on the outcomes of these
petitions.
THE OUTCOMES OF CVRA MANDAMUS PETITIONS AND THE IMPACT OF THE
REVIEW STANDARD UTILIZED

IV.

A.

The Overall Outcomes of CVRA MandamusPetitions

As described in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table below, in the ten years
since the enactment of the CVRA, the federal appellate courts have resolved 73
mandamus petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA. These mandamus petitions have
involved 62 separate petitioners (or petitioner groups). Seven of these 62 petitioners have
been the same (regarding the "Amy" and/or "Vicky" petitions), but they have filed their
petitions regarding separate underlying prosecutions.193
188
189
190
191
192

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 90-167 and accompanying text.
supra notes 112-26, 147-67 and accompanying text.
supra notes 90-111, 128-46 and accompanying text.
supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
infra notes 468-69 and accompanying text.

See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table. The mandamus petitions included in the table were identified
through two sources, i.e., the annual reports prepared for Congress by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts pursuant to the CVRA and a search of the LexisNexis data base. The Administrative Office of the
193
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Overall, the federal appellate courts have denied or dismissed 62 (85%) of the 73
CVRA mandamus petitions. 194 The appellate courts have denied or dismissed 23 of these
petitions (indicated with an "*" in the table), with limited discussion, on the ground that
the petitioners' claims were not properly raised pursuant to the CVRA, e.g., petitioners
attempting to raise claims in connection with civil proceedings, petitioners attempting to
intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to them, and petitioners attempting to utilize
the CVRA mandamus remedy to pursue relief on other grounds.19 5 In the remaining 39
CVRA mandamus petition denials, the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed
specific claims raised pursuant to the CVRA before ultimately determining to deny the
requested relief. 196 Of the 73 CVRA mandamus petitions reviewed, the federal appellate
courts have granted 11 petitions (15%) to some degree. 19 7

CVRA MANDAMUS OUTCOMES TABLE
FIRST CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Haas, No. 08-2378

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

United States Courts has thus far filed nine annual reports with Congress describing the CVRA mandamus
actions brought and their outcomes, with the most recent report filed on April 30, 2014. See Justice for All Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 104(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2265. A search of the LexisNexis United States Courts of
Appeals data base was also conducted for CVRA mandamus petitions resolved as of October 30, 2014, ten years
after the enactment of the CVRA, using the search terms "Crime Victims' Rights Act" or "Crime Victims Rights
Act" or 3771. Thus, the materials described in this Article are current, as of October 30, 2014.
In addition to these mandamus petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA, in United States v. Burkholder,
590 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2010), the Government raised a crime victim-related issue in its appeal of an offender's
sentence, as authorized by the CVRA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(4) (West Pamp. 2014). The federal appellate
courts that have addressed the issue have generally concluded that the CVRA does not authorize non-parties,
including crime victims, to appeal an offender's sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 715-18
(8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014); In re
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 755-56 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d
1301, 1304-07 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540-44 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States
v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 52-55 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510, 513 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008); Kennav. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th
Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2005); compare In re Acker, 596
F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010), with In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2009).
194 See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
195 See id.; see also, e.g., In re Mujaddid, 563 F. App'x 874 (3d Cir. 2014) (attempting to utilize the CVRA
mandamus remedy to obtain other forms of relief); In re Bond, No. 13-2462 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2013) (attempting
to intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to him); In re Nabaya, 481 F. App'x 64 (4th Cir. 2012)
(attempting to assert CVRA claims in connection with a civil proceeding); In re Hamilton, No. 10-3294 (7th Cir.
Oct. 6, 2010) (attempting to intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to her); In re Ross, 380 F. App'x 356
(4th Cir. 2010) (attempting to use the CVRA mandamus remedy to attack the legality of his confinement);
Williamson v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 06-74584 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2006) (attempting to utilize the CVRA
mandamus remedy to pursue claims against government officials and to seek a wide range of relief, including an
injunction prohibiting the use of "microwaves" on him).
16 See, e.g., In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370 (6th
Cir. 2010); WR. HuffAsset Mgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 555.
197 See, e.g., In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
2012); In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Although the Fifth Circuit initially granted mandamus, in part,
to stay trial court action pending further order of the appellate court, it ultimately denied the petitioners'
mandamus petition in In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2008). See infra notes 352-63 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition). Therefore, this petition is included with the mandamus petition
denials rather than those petitions that have been granted.
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(Oct. 30, 2008).*

Hearing

SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Galvis, 564 F.3d

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

170 (2009).

Restitution

In re W.R. Huff Asset

Confer/Notice/ Fairness/Restitution

Denied

In re Local #46 Metallic

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

Lathers Union, 568 F.3d

Restitution

Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d
555 (2005).

81 (2009).
THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Dawalibi, 338 F.

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

App'x 112 (2009).*

Fairness/Privacy

In re El, 553 F. App'x

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Hearing

Denied

Petitioner
In re Bankr. Estate of

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

AGS, Inc., 565 F. App'x
172 (2014).

Restitution

In re Bond, 547 F.

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

In re Brock, 262 F.

Hearing/Fairness/Disclosure of

Denied

App'x 510 (2008).

presentence report

113 (2014).*

In re Mujaddid, 563 F.
App'x 874, cert. denied
sub nom. Mujaddid v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 135 S.
Ct. 133 (2014).*

In re Walsh, 229 F.
App'x 58 (2007).*
In re Zackey, No. 103772, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19914 (Sept. 22,
2010).
FOURTH CIRCUIT

App'x 348 (2013).*
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In re Doe, 264 F. App'x

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

260 (2007).

Restitution

Denied

In re Gyamfi, 362 F.

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Outcome
Granted (for trial

App'x 385 (2010).*

In re Nabaya, 481 F.
App'x 64 (2012).*

In re Rochester, 292 F.
App'x 226 (2008).*

In re Rodriguez, 275 F.
App'x 192 (2008).*

In re Ross, 380 F.
App'x 356 (2010).*

In re Searcy, 202 F.
App'x 625 (2006).*
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Allen, 701 F.3d
734 (2012).

court to consider
new arguments

raised re victim
In re Allen, 568 F.
App'x 314 (2014).
In re Amy Unknown,
701 F.3d 749 (2012),
vacated and remanded
sub nom. Paroline v.

Restitution
Restitution

United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1710 (2014).
In re Amy Unknown,
No. 13-20485 (Aug. 30,
2013).
In re Butler, No. 0620848 (Nov. 1, 2006).
In re Community
Housing Fund, No. 1111155 (Dec. 9, 2011).
In re Dean, 527 F.3d
391 (2008).

status)
Denied
Granted (re
restitution
determination),
but vacated by

the Court and

Restitution/Abatement

remanded
Granted (re
restitution
determination)
Denied

Restitution

Denied

Notice/Confer

Granted in part
(to temporarily
stay further trial
court action);

Restitution

In re Fisher, 640 F.3d

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

645 (2011).

Restitution

In re Fisher, No. 11-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

10006, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26500 (Oct. 1,
2011).

Restitution

In re May, No. 13-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied
Denied
Denied

Denied

30773 (July 24, 2013).*
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In re Thaler, No. 13-

Delay

40171 (Feb. 15, 2013).

Dismissed as
moot

SIXTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Acker, 596 F.3d

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

370 (2010).

Notice/Restitution

In re McNulty, 597

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

F.3d 344 (2010).

Restitution

In re Siler, 571 F.3d

Disclosure of presentence report

Denied

604 (2009).
In re Simons, 567 F.3d
800 (2009).

Fairness/Dignity

Granted (to
require trial

Denied

court action on
pending motion)
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Bustos, No. 102752 (July 26, 2010).

Intervention in proceedings/Hearing

Denied

In re Hamilton No. 10-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

In re Oak Brook Bank,

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

No. 06-2331 (May 12,
2006).

Hearing/Restitution

In re Sabbia, No. 07-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Vicky, 709 F.3d
712 (2013), vacated and
remandedsub nom.

Restitution

Denied, but
vacated by the
Court and

3294 (Oct. 6, 2010).*

In re Hamilton, No. 121059 (Jan. 12, 2012).*

1368 (Feb. 21, 2007).*

In re Sabbia, No. 103316, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27411 (Oct. 7,
2010).*
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct.

remanded

1934 (2014).
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NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Amy & Vicky,
710 F.3d 985 (2013).

Restitution

Granted in part
(to determine an
amount of
restitution),

In re Amy & Vicky,
714 F.3d 1165 (2013).
In re Amy & Vicky,
698 F.3d 1151 (2012),
vacated and remanded
sub nom. Amy and

Restitution

Denied

Restitution

Denied, but
vacated by the
Court and
remanded

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Denied in part

Vicky v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959
(2014).

In re Andrich, 668 F.3d
1050 (2011).

Kenna v. U.S. Dist.

Hearing

Granted (re right

Court, 435 F.3d 1011
(2006).

to be heard and
to permit motion

In re Kenna, 453 F.3d

Disclosure of presentence report

for re-opening of
sentencing
proceeding)
Denied

1136 (2006).
In re K.K., 756 F.3d
1169 (2014).

Privacy

Denied (but
ordered

preliminary in
camera review of
In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d
1137 (2006).

Exclusion

documents)
Granted in part
(for trial court to

conduct CVRA
exclusion
analysis)
In re Morning Star

Restitution

Packing Co., 711 F.3d

Granted (to

make restitution

1142 (2013).

determination

In re Parker, Nos. 09-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

using correct
standards)
Granted (re

70529, 09-70533, 2009

Exclusion

victim status and

U.S. App. LEXIS

to make

10270 (Feb. 27, 2009).

particularized

finding re
exclusion of
each petitioner)
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In re Stake Ctr.
Locating, Inc., 717 F.3d
1089 (2013).
In re Stake Ctr.
Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d
949 (2013).

Restitution

Denied (as
premature)

Forfeiture

Denied

Williamson v. U.S.

CVRA eligibility

Denied

Privacy

Denied without
prejudice

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Outcome
Denied

In re Antrobus, No. 08-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

4013, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27527 (Feb. 1,
2008).

discovery

In re Antrobus, 563

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

F.3d 1092 (2009).
In re Olesen, 447 F.
App'x 868 (2011).

issue re-opening
Delay/Fairness

Denied

In re Pinson, No. I1-

CVRA filing fee provisions

Dismissed as

Dist. Court, No. 0674584 (Sept. 29,
2006).*
In re Zito, No. 0970554 (Feb. 26, 2009).
TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Antrobus, 519
F.3d 1123 (2008).

1425 (Oct. 14, 2011).*

moot

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Aquino, No. 12-

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

11757-B (Apr. 6, 2012).

Hearing

In re Aquino, No. 12-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

13238-B (June 22,
2012)

In re Instituto
Costarricense de
Electricidad, Nos. 1112707-G, 11-12708-G
(June 17, 2011).

In re Miller, No. 0615182 (Sept. 28,
2006).*

In re Searcy, No. 0614951 (Sept. 15,
2006).*

In re Stewart, 552 F.3d

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Granted (re

1285 (2008).
In re Stewart, 641 F.3d
1271 (2011).

Hearing
Restitution

victim status)
Denied
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In re Wellcare Health

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d
1234 (2014).

Restitution

Denied

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Amy, 641 F.3d
528 (2011).

Restitution

Granted in part
(to determine
amount of
restitution)

In re Chacin de
Henriquez, No. 10-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied without
prejudice to

3051, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12129 (June 11,
2010).

In re Jacobsen, No. 05-

renewal

Hearing

Denied as moot

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

7086, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13990 (July 8,
2005).

Rodriguez v. Editor in
Chief, Legal Times, No.
07-5234, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28154
(Apr. 23, 2008).*

Sieverding v. American
Bar Ass'n, No. 07-

Dismissed for
lack of

5126, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13756 (June 8,
2007).*

prosecution

B.

The Issues Addressed in CVRA Mandamus Petitions

As reflected in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table, the issues most
frequently addressed in the mandamus petitions filed in the ten years since the CVRA's
enactment have concerned 1) the CVRA crime victim definition and petitioners' eligibility
for CVRA crime victim status; 2) the CVRA right to restitution; and 3) the CVRA
participatory rights to confer with the prosecutor, to notice of proceedings, not to be
excluded from the proceedings, and to be heard in the proceedings. 19" In all, 68 of the 73
CVRA mandamus petitions (93%) involve some aspect of these issues. Of the 50 petitions
in which the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed specific claims raised
pursuant to the CVRA, 45 (90%) address these issues. To illustrate the extent to which the
specific mandamus review standards have had an impact on the outcomes of CVRA
petitions addressing these issues, the following discussion of the outcomes of these 45
petitions is grouped by appellate circuit review standard. These three groups are, as
follows: the traditional mandamus review standard adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits; the more expansive review standards
adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits, and arguably the Third Circuit; and the
"standardless" First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. 99
198

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.

See id.; supra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA mandamus review standards); cf
infra note 343 (describing the outcomes regarding the five petitions that have raised other CVRA issues).
199
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CVRA Crime Victim Status

The issue most frequently addressed in the CVRA mandamus petitions resolved
thus far concerns petitioners' attempts to be deemed eligible "crime victims" for purposes
of asserting CVRA rights.20 0 In their mandamus review, the federal appellate courts have
thus considered federal trial courts' application of the CVRA "crime victim" definition,
i.e., whether a petitioner is a "person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia," 201 a definition
incorporating well-known concepts of causation and foreseeability of harm.2 02
a.

More Expansive Review Standard Circuits

Utilizing their more expansive review standards, the Second and Ninth Circuits
have each reviewed two mandamus petitions dealing with a petitioner's eligibility for
CVRA crime victim status.20 3 Applying its abuse of discretion review standard, the
Second Circuit has denied mandamus in both of the cases it has considered.2 04 In In re
Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union,205 in which the defendant was convicted of a money

laundering conspiracy, the trial court determined that the defendant's subsequent use of
the laundered cash to make employee payments that deprived the petitioner union of
related union benefit funds did not make the union a CVRA victim of the defendant's
206
money laundering crime entitled to restitution. The trial court found that the defendant's

200
201

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e) (West Pamp. 2014); see id. (identifying eligible representatives for minor,

incompetent, incapacitated, and deceased crime victims). During the discussion of the CVRA on the Senate
floor, Senator Jon Kyl, one of the CVRA's primary sponsors, stated that the legislation defined a "crime victim"
as a "person directly and proximately banned as a result of any offense, felony or misdemeanor. This is an
intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not
they are the victim of the count charged." 150 CONG. REC. S4,270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Jon Kyl); accord id. (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see 150 CONG. REC. S 10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (indicating the inclusion of victims "whether or not they are the victim of the count
charged"). But see WR. HuffAsset Mgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 564 (stating that the CVRA does not confer rights
against "individuals who have not been convicted of a crime").
202 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011); In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 349-53 (6th Cir.
2010); cf Aaronson, supra note 8, at 637-42 (discussing the CVRA victim definition); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at
594-95 (stating that the CVRA crime victim definition "invokes" the concept of foreseeability and is not limited
to the crime of conviction). The CVRA requirement of direct and proximate harm is similar to the crime victim
definition used in the primary federal restitution statutes:
[T]he term "victim" means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an
offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity,
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014) (defining victim status in the primary
federal discretionary and mandatory restitution provisions); see Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 594 & n.65 (stating
that the CVRA crime victim definition is "based on" these restitution statutes); cf 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1593(c),
2248(c), 2259(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014) (defining a "victim" as "the individual hanned as a result of a
commission of' the applicable crime in the mandatory restitution provisions regarding human trafficking, sexual
abuse, and sexual exploitation and abuse of children).
203 The Third Circuit has not reviewed any mandamus petitions regarding this issue. See supra CVRA Mandamus
Outcomes Table.
204 See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text
(describing these petitions).,
205 568 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
206

Id. at 85-88.
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crime of conviction was
complete atMANAMUSMUDDE215
the moment the defendant received the cash.2 07 The
Second Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the union
was not directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's offense.2 08

In In re Galvis,209 the Second Circuit also found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying CVRA victim status to the mother of a decedent who was
murdered in Columbia by members of an organization that the offender led and regarding
which he was convicted in Columbia.2 10 The offender, however, was extradited to the
United States and convicted for drug conspiracy charges. 211 The appellate court found no
clear error in the trial court's factual finding that there was an insufficient causal
connection between the Columbian murder and the drug conspiracy conviction charge to
establish the direct and proximate harm required for CVRA victim status.2 12
Without a discussion of the specific facts in In re Andrich,2 13 the Ninth Circuit
found the trial court did not clearly err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in
concluding that the CVRA rights did not apply to the petitioners.2 14 The appellate court
concluded that the mandamus petition should be denied under either the CVRA or its
traditional mandamus authority.2 15 On the other hand, again without a discussion of the
specific facts in In re Parker,216 the Ninth Circuit granted a CVRA mandamus petition
217
addressing crime victim status2.
The appellate court found that the trial court had erred in
its conclusion that the petitioners in the underlying air pollution prosecution did not satisfy
the CVRA crime victim definition and thus were not eligible for the CVRA-prescribed
218
determination concerning their exclusion from court proceedings.
b.

Traditional Review Standard Circuits

The appellate circuits utilizing the traditional mandamus review standard have
also denied most, but not all, of the petitions regarding CVRA victim status. The Eleventh
Circuit has denied petitions in which the petitioner has actually played a role in the

207

Id. at 86.

208

Id. at 85 & n.2 (applying similar "victim" definition of applicable restitution statute (18 U.S.C.A. §

3663A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014)) because the petitioner had presented its case under this provision).

Although the defendant planned to use the laundered money to pay employees in cash and thereby avoid taxes
and union obligations, he was only charged with and convicted of the money laundering crime. The appellate
court found the fact that the Government agreed not to charge the defendant for acts related to defrauding union
benefit funds further supported the trial court's determination that this conduct was separate from the money
laundering conviction offense. See id. at 86-87.
209 564 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 174-76.
Id. at 172.
212 See id. at 175-76; cf supranotes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
210
211

213

214

668 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011).

Id. at 1051.
See id.; supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard). The petitioners had
asserted that they were victims of additional unrelated and uncharged federal offenses committed after the
215

defendant entered a plea to mail fraud. The trial court denied their motion to intervene in the criminal case and to
be heard at the defendant's sentencing. See United States v. McMahan, No. 8:07-cr-00249-CJC (C.D. Cal. Nov.
11,2011).
216 Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10270 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009).
217 Id at *1.
218 See id.; infra notes 381-84
and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §
3771(a)(3) (West Pamp. 2014); cf United Statesv. W.R. Grace, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1159-66(D. Mont. 2009)

(describing the basis of the trial court's findings regarding the petitioners' crime victim status), vacated, CR 0507-M-DWM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124996 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009).
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underlying crime regarding which CVRA crime victim status has been sought. 2 1 9 The
Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an
employee, who refused to participate in his defendant company's antitrust conspiracy and
was subsequently fired and "blackballed" in the related industry, was not a CVRA victim
of the conspiracy and that the petitioner had not demonstrated a clear and indisputable
right to the writ.220 In two related mandamus proceedings, the Fifth Circuit considered a
trial court's denial of CVRA victim status to the petitioners who invested funds to gain
city approval and financing of housing projects that were granted to co-defendants who
engaged in a public corruption-related bribery conspiracy. 2 2 1 The appellate court found
that the trial court's factual findings-that the petitioners' claims that they were directly
and proximately harmed by the defendants' bribery conspiracy were too speculativewere not clearly erroneous, and the petitioners had not clearly and indisputably established
their CVRA victim status.222

In In re Antrobus,223 the Tenth Circuit considered a trial court's denial of CVRA
victim status to the parents of a decedent subsequently murdered (with others) with a gun
the defendant illegally sold to the murderer when he was a juvenile. 224 The appellate court
found that the trial court was not clearly wrong in concluding the defendant's crime of the
gun sale was "too factually and temporally attenuated" from the murder over seven
months later when the murderer was an adult, and that the murderer's acts were an
225
"independent, intervening cause" of the petitioners' daughter's death.
Although
characterizing it as a "difficult case," the Tenth Circuit concluded that the petitioners had
not established a clear and indisputable right to the writ.22 6

See In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding no clear abuse of
discretion in trial court denial of CVRA victim status to un-indicted co-conspirator and no showing of clear and
indisputable right to the writ); In re Aquino, No. 12-13238-B (11th Cir. June 22, 2012) (finding no clear error in
trial court denial of CVRA victim status to persons who sought fraudulent foreign worker visas from the offender
and her co-conspirators); In re Aquino, No. 12-11757-B (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012) (finding no clearly erroneous
factual findings or misapplication of law regarding the above-described victim status determination, actual trial
court affording of right to be heard regarding victim status, and no entitlement to relief under any potential
CVRA review standard); In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Nos. 11-12707-G, 11-12708-G (11th Cir.
June 17, 2011) (finding that the trial court did not clearly err in denying CVRA victim status to the entity that
functioned as the offenders' co-conspirator); cf 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(1) (prohibiting a person "accused of the
crime" from obtaining relief pursuant to the CVRA).
220 See In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 349-53 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the review standard).
221 In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645 (5th Cir.), reconsiderationdenied, 649 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Fisher, No.
11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 2011).
222 Fisher, 640 F.3d at 647-50 (addressing trial court findings regarding speculation as to the role that the bribery
played in the award of city support to the co-defendants rather than the petitioners and the petitioners' decision to
invest funds in their projects); Fisher, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500, at * 1-4 (finding no clear and indisputable
error in the trial court's determination regarding the petitioners' victim status).
223 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008).
224 Id at 1123-24.
225 Id. at 1125-26 (quoting United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 413, at *4-5
(D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008)).
226 See id. at 1125-26, 1130-3 1; supra notes 90-97, 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing the review
standard). A contested fact regarding the causation issue was whether the defendant had heard the murderer say,
at the time of the gun sale, that he intended to commit a bank robbery (i.e., a crime different than the one in
which the petitioners' daughter and others were murdered). The trial judge had stated that his determination of
CVRA victim status would not change even assuming the existence of this fact. SeeAntrobus, 519 F.3d at 1124,
1125 & n.1; United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1323, at *4 (D. Utah Jan. 8,
2008); see also In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying mandamus based on petitioners'
claim of newly discovered evidence establishing that the defendant heard the murderer say that he planned to rob
a bank with the gun purchased from the defendant); cf In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
27527, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008) (finding no clear abuse of discretion in trial court's denial of discovery of
219
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The federal appellate circuits utilizing the traditional mandamus review standard
have granted two CVRA mandamus petitions concerning CVRA crime victim status. 2 2 7 In
In re Allen,228 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a petition in which the trial court, finding
insufficient evidence of harm, had initially denied the Government's motion to grant
victim status to identified community members who resided in the area of the defendants'
Clean Air Act violations. 2 2 9 Four years later, and two months before sentencing, the
petitioners, now through their own pro bono counsel, again attempted to be declared
CVRA crime victims. The trial judge denied their request as untimely without addressing
the merits of their claim. 230 In its mandamus review of the trial court's action, the Fifth
Circuit found that the CVRA does not have a time limit for obtaining trial court relief that
would preclude the potential granting of relief under the facts of this case. 2 3 1 The appellate
court found that the circuit's three-part mandamus standard was satisfied, including the
fact that it was clear and indisputable that no time bar prevented the trial court from
considering the new arguments made by the petitioners' counsel in support of their victim
status and the consequent appropriateness of the issuance of the writ.2 3 2 The Fifth Circuit
granted the petitioners' writ to require the trial court to consider the new arguments
presented by their counsel in support of the petitioners' victim status.233
In In re Stewart,234 the Eleventh Circuit considered a mandamus petition brought
by home purchasers seeking CVRA victim status regarding a defendant bank official who
conspired to deprive the bank of honest services by charging the petitioners an additional
mortgage brokerage fee which he and his co-conspirator split. 2 3 5 The trial court found that
the petitioners were not victims of the defendant's conspiracy to deprive the bank of
honest services and denied their request to be heard.2 36 The appellate court rejected the
respondents' claim that the petitioners were not harmed by the conspiracy because their

Environment: The Problem with Extending Victims' Rights to Victims of Environmental Crimes, 67 WASH.

&

Government investigative files and grand jury transcripts in petitioners' attempt to establish CVRA victim
status); supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (describing this petition).
In denying mandamus in another case, the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve the petitioners'
claim that the trial court had refused to recognize them as CVRA crime victims. Regardless whether the
petitioners met the CVRA crime victim definition, the appellate court found that the trial court had allowed the
petitioners a full opportunity for participation in the proceedings, as petitioners themselves acknowledged, and
had actually afforded them the status of CVRA crime victims. See In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir.
2010); supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
The District of Columbia Circuit denied without prejudice to renewal a mandamus petition seeking a writ
directing the trial court to decide the petitioners' CVRA victim status. Because this matter was already
proceeding toward resolution in the trial court, the appellate court determined that mandamus relief was not
currently warranted. See In re Chacin de Henriquez, No. 10-3051, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12129, at *1-2 (D.C.
Cir. June 11, 2010).
227 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
228 701 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2012).
229 Id. at 735.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.; compare United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d
848, 852-54 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding
that it had previously applied an incorrect legal standard to determine the community members' victim status,
reversing its prior ruling, and deeming the community members CVRA victims), with United States v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37371 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2011), reconsiderationdenied,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82818 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2011) (describing the basis of the trial court's initial ruling
regarding the community members' CVRA victim status). See generally Andrew Atkins, Note, A Complicated
LEE L. REv. 1623 (2010); Ashley Ferguson, Comment, We 're Victims, Too!: The Needfor GreaterProtection of
Environmental Crime Victims Under the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 287 (2011).

552 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1286-87.
236 Id. at
1287.
234
235
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real estate developers had agreed to pay their closing costs, including the inflated
mortgage brokerage fee. 2 3 7 The Eleventh Circuit found that the petitioners remained liable
to the bank for the closing costs, regardless of the developers' agreement to pay the
costs. 2 38 As a result, the petitioners, as well as the bank, were directly and proximately
harmed by the conspiracy and were CVRA victims. The appellate court granted the writ
and ordered the trial court to recognize the petitioners as CVRA victims and afford them
the CVRA rights associated with this status. 2 3 9
c.

"Standardless" Review Circuits

The Fourth Circuit, which has not adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard,
has denied two mandamus petitions regarding a petitioner's crime victim status.24 0 One
petition involved the bankruptcy estate of an entity that the defendant had utilized to carry
out his health care fraud scheme. The appellate court found that neither the entity nor its
creditors were directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's fraud offenses. 2 4 1 The
other petition involved a petitioner who had become addicted to a prescription drug she
used to treat chronic pain, and who sought CVRA victim status in the criminal prosecution
of an entity accused of misbranding the drug with the intent to defraud or mislead. 242
Because the appellate court concluded that the petitioner's addiction-related harm was not
directly and proximately caused by the defendant's misbranding of the drug, she did not
qualify as a victim of the crime charged. 243
2.

Restitution

The CVRA provides crime victims the right to "full and timely restitution as
,,244
provided in law.
Thus, the CVRA does not provide an additional right to restitution for
CVRA crime victims, but ensures the provision of restitution to the degree afforded by

237
238
239

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
Id.; see supra note 152-55, infra note 400 and accompanying text (discussing this petition). But see Stewart,

552 F.3d at 1290 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (finding no clear abuse of discretion or clear and indisputable right to
the writ, as required under the traditional review standard). In finding that the petitioners had established their
CVRA victim status, the appellate court stated that, as long as the requisite harm was established, a CVRA
victim did not have to be named in the charging document or have an identity that constituted an element of the
crime. Id. at 1289.
240 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
241 See In re Bankruptcy Estate of AGS, Inc., 565 F. App'x 172,
174-75 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing the
petitioner's ineligibility for restitution due to its lack of victim status); supra notes 179-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the review standard).
242 In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 261
(4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2007).
243 See id. at 263-64 (describing the petitioner's ineligibility for restitution
due to her lack of victim status). The
appellate court found that the petitioner did not allege that she directly relied on or was even aware of the drug
misbranding. Even assuming that she became aware of "common misperceptions" regarding the drug resulting
from the misbranding, the appellate court found the causation chain between the misbranding and the petitioner's
addiction was "too attenuated" to establish the requisite causation. See id.; cf id. at 264-65 (King, J., concurring)
(finding it unnecessary to resolve the causation issue in order to deny mandamus). The appellate court found it
unnecessary to determine the applicable review standard because it concluded that the petitioner would not be
entitled to relief even under the "lower standard" and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
See id. at 262, 264; supra note 173-75 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
The Seventh Circuit denied a petition that the appellate court found was prematurely filed in that the trial
court had not expressly denied the petitioner CVRA victim status and was actually permitting the petitioner to
participate in the determination of victim status. See In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12,
2006).
244 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West Pamp. 2014).
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other statutes. 2 4 5 The federal statutes include both mandatory and discretionary restitution
provisions,2 4 6 with victim eligibility definitions in the primary restitution statutes similar
to the definition adopted in the CVRA. 2 47 Restitution is mandatory for all federal violent
and property crimes in which an "identifiable" victim has suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss. 248 Restitution is discretionary regarding other crimes. 249 Regarding
property crimes, however, restitution is not mandatory if the court determines that the
large number of victims makes restitution "impracticable" or the determination of
complex factual issues regarding a victim's loss would "complicate or prolong" the
sentencing process such that the burden on the sentencing process outweighs the need to
provide restitution.250 The court may also decline discretionary restitution if the
complication and prolongation of sentencing proceedings required to fashion a restitution
251
order outweigh the need for restitution.
The CVRA restitution-related mandamus claims thus far include those described
in the previous section in which the petitioner was not deemed to be an eligible crime
victim either under the CVRA or restitution statutory definition or both, and thus was not
eligible for restitution. 252 They also include petitions, described in this section, by eligible
crime victims who have contested the denial or grant of restitution in their individual
cases. Almost half of these petitions involve the pursuit of restitution by two child
pornography victims in multiple appellate circuits.253
a.

Restitution Petitions Generally
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

Applying its abuse of discretion review standard in In re W.R. Huff Asset
Management Co.,254 the Second Circuit denied mandamus petitions brought by two groups
of claimants that had purchased securities from an entity associated with defendants
convicted of securities fraud. 255 The interrelated criminal, civil, and bankruptcy
proceedings involved potentially tens of thousands of victims. The petitioners sought to
vacate a settlement agreement incorporating forfeiture of defendant assets in lieu of
See Doe, 264 F. App'x at 262 n.2; In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005); 150
CONG. REC. S4,268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (stating that the CVRA restitution
right, in combination with the rights to be heard and confer with the prosecutor, "means that existing restitution
laws will be more effective"); accordid. (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 150 CONG. REC. S 10,911
(daily ed. Oct.9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (repeating this statement and adding an endorsement of the
"expansive definition" of restitution given in cited decisions); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 610-11 (repeating this
statement and describing the interplay between the CVRA restitution right and the restitution statutes).
246 See infra notes 247-51 and accompanying
text.
247 See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text
(discussing victim definitions).
248 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); see also 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1593, 2248, 2259 (West 2000
& Supp. 2014) (describing the mandatory restitution provisions regarding human trafficking, sexual abuse, and
sexual exploitation and abuse of children).
249 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3664 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014)
(describing restitution procedures including an initial award of restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss).
250 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(3).
251 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
252 See, e.g., In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Bankr. Estate of AGS,
Inc., 565 F. App'x 172, 175 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir.), reconsiderationdenied,
649 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Fisher, No. 11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
2011); In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81,
88 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 264 (4th Cir.
Aug. 9, 2007).
253 See infra notes 254-327 and accompanying text.
254 409 F.3d 555 (2d
Cir. 2005).
255 Id. at 564.
245
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restitution or a fine at sentencing and adopted in connection with a related non-prosecution
agreement that established a $715 million fund to compensate victims of the securities
fraud.25 6 The petitioners contended that the fund provided less than the required full
restitution for the fraud victims and further limited their opportunities for additional
recoveries by including releases and indemnifications for various defendants.25 7
The Second Circuit found that the trial court had not abused its discretion both in
finding that the number of crime victims and the complexity of determining victim losses
satisfied the above-described exceptions to the mandatory restitution provision and by
accepting the settlement agreement as "reasonable substitute restitution." 2 58 The appellate
court further noted that the trial court's acceptance of the settlement in lieu of a complex
restitution determination with an uncertain recovery was consistent with the CVRA's
provision regarding prosecutions with multiple crime victims:259 "In a case where the
court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the
crime victims the rights [identified in the CVRA], the court shall fashion a reasonable
procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the
proceedings." 2 6 0
In In re Morning Star Packing Co.,261 the Ninth Circuit, however, found that the
trial court had committed legal error in denying restitution to petitioners who claimed they
were entitled to mandatory restitution for the full amount of their losses caused by the
defendant's crime. 262 The trial court had based its denial on determinations that it "would
be an unduly complex and time-consuming exercise" to determine restitution, the
defendant could not financially satisfy a restitution award, and the victims could pursue
relief in civil proceedings.2 6 3 The appellate court concluded that the trial court committed
legal error by basing its denial on these factors because the defendant's financial capacity
and the availability of a civil remedy are not proper statutory factors to consider regarding
264
the imposition of mandatory restitution. In addition, the record was unclear whether the
trial court had conducted the required statutory balancing test that the burden on the
sentencing process outweighed the need for restitution in the case.265 The Ninth Circuit
granted the mandamus petition and required the trial court to vacate its judgment denying
restitution and conduct further proceedings using appropriate factors to determine whether
266
to award restitution in the case.

256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 557-59.
See id. at 560-61.
Id. at 563-64.
See id. at 564; supra notes 48-59; infra notes 344-51 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014).
711 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id, at 1143-44.
id.

See id.
Id. at 1144.
266 See id. (applying provisions in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A, 3664 (West
2000 & Pamp. 2014)). The Ninth Circuit
denied, as "unripe," a restitution-related petition filed prior to the defendant's sentencing. In re Stake Center
Locating, Inc., 717 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013); cf In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12,
2006) (denying the petitioner's restitution claim as premature without reference to a review standard). The Ninth
Circuit subsequently found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error by denying the
petitioner's motion to compel the Government to initiate forfeiture proceedings to obtain property "traceable" to
the defendant's crimes, in addition to the restitution already awarded to the petitioner. The appellate court found
that the CVRA did not provide a victim right to criminal forfeiture or impair the Government's "broad
discretion" regarding seeking such forfeiture. See In re Stake Center Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d 949, 950-51 (9th
Cir. 2013).
264

26 5
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TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

Applying traditional mandamus review standards in In re Allen, 267 the Fifth
Circuit denied a CVRA petition regarding which the trial court had denied restitution, in
part, based on a conclusion that the difficulties of determining restitution and resultant
burden on the sentencing process outweighed any need for restitution.26 8 The petition
concerned a Clean Air Act prosecution in which the trial court had determined that all
persons who lived near the refinery that caused the violation during a specified period,
demonstrated specified symptoms, and submitted victim impact statements by a specified
date would be deemed CVRA crime victims. 269 Over 800 individuals submitted victim
impact statements and experts and over 90 victims had offered oral testimony in
connection with the restitution claims. 27 0 The trial court found that the crime victims had
not established the factual basis for their restitution claims based on the presented
evidence and that the difficulties of determining restitution and resultant burden on the
sentencing process outweighed any need for restitution under the discretionary restitution
provisions.271 The Fifth Circuit found that the petitioners had not demonstrated that the
trial court clearly and indisputably erred in invoking this exception to the discretionary
grant of restitution.

272

In In re Acker, 273 the Sixth Circuit denied a restitution-related petition after
adopting the traditional mandamus standard that included a required showing of a "clear
abuse of discretion." 274 The petitioners sought 1) to vacate the plea agreement in this
antitrust prosecution that did not include restitution "in deference to" the related pending
civil litigation, and 2) to participate as parties to its renegotiation to include restitution.2 75
The appellate court found that the trial court had considered all appropriate factors and
had reasonably applied the exception to the grant of restitution for cases in which the
burden on the sentencing process due to a determination of restitution outweighed any
need for restitution. The Sixth Circuit found that the CVRA did not compel restitution in
this case and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in accepting the plea
agreement.27 6
In In re Stewart,277 the Eleventh Circuit denied a restitution-related petition prior

to its formal adoption of the traditional mandamus review standard, but based on its
conclusion that a petitioner showing of a clearly erroneous factual finding by the trial
court in denying restitution was required in the instant case regardless of what review
standard was applied.278 The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the petitioners'
267
268

568 F. App'x 314 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 315-16.

See id.; United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60172 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
30, 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); cf supra note 228-33 and accompanying
text (describing previous grant of mandamus for the trial court to consider additional arguments regarding the
petitioners' CVRA victim status and the trial court's subsequent redetermination of its previous denial of victim
status).
270 Allen, 568 F. App'x at 315.
271 See id. at 315-16.
272 See id. The Fifth Circuit denied two other restitution-related CVRA mandamus petitions. See In re
Community Housing Fund, No. 11-11155 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) (petition regarding restitution denied to the
petitioner fund controlled by the defendants); In re Butler, No. 06-20848 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2006) (petition denied
concerning an abated prosecution regarding which the petitioner claimed restitution).
273 596 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2010).
274 Id. at 372-73.
269

275

Id. at 373.

See id.; supra notes 131-3 5, infira note 363 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
641 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).
278 Id. at 1274-75.
276

277
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claimed loss resulted from their builders' failure to complete their construction projects
and the resulting default on their construction loans rather than the defendant's fraudulent
collection of an additional mortgage brokerage fee. As a result, the petitioners were not
entitled to restitution from the defendant and the appellate court denied their mandamus
petition.279
b.

"Amy" and "Vicky" Petitions

Seven CVRA mandamus petitions thus far have involved trial courts' application
of the specific mandatory restitution provision concerning sexual exploitation and abuse of
children. 28 0 This provision requires mandatory restitution to an individual "harmed as a
result of' an applicable crime in the "full amount" of the victim's loss in specifically
identified areas, such as medical services, therapy, attorney's fees, and lost income, as
well as any other losses suffered as a "proximate result" of the crime. 281 The CVRA
petitions have concerned one or both petitioners, designated by the pseudonyms "Amy"
and "Vicky," who were sexually abused as children and whose abusers filmed and
distributed images of the abuse. The petitions have addressed prosecutions in which Amy
or Vicky, or both, have sought restitution in the full amount of their losses-as much as
approximately $3.4 million for Amy and $1.3 million for Vicky-from defendants
subsequently convicted of possessing, transporting, or distributing child pornography that
included images of Amy and/or Vicky. 2812 In addressing these petitions, the appellate
courts reached different conclusions regarding whether all of a victim's claimed losses
must be proximately caused by a defendant's conduct or only the "catchall" non-specific
category of losses in the restitution statute. The Court ultimately resolved the conflict
among the circuits regarding the proximate causation requirement in Paroline v. United
2 83

States.

i.

TraditionalReview Standard Circuits

Appellate circuits that had adopted traditional mandamus review standards
initially addressed CVRA petitions regarding this issue. The Fifth Circuit was the first to
address a CVRA mandamus petition filed by Amy regarding a child pornography
possession prosecution in which two images of Amy were found among a large number of
images of children on the defendant's computer. 2814 The trial court concluded that the
See id. at 1275 (finding that the petitioners approved the construction draws and were therefore on notice that
the bank would deduct the mortgage-related fee from them); supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the review standard); cf supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (granting mandamus regarding
the petitioners' victim status).
280 See infra notes 281-327 and accompanying text.
281 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 2000).
282 In the years since the sexual abuse images were filmed, they have been widely circulated by and among third
parties. At least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse have been found among the evidence in over 3,200 child
pornography cases since 1998. Amy's restitution claim of approximately $3.4 million is based on the total
amount of her losses from the production, distribution, and possession of the images and primarily consists of
losses for future psychological care and lost income. Restitution has been ordered to Amy in amounts ranging
from $100 to over $3.5 million in at least 174 child pornography cases. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749,
752-53 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710 (2014). Vicky's losses of over $1.3 million primarily include lost income, counseling expenses, and
attorney's fees. She has received restitution to some extent in at least 309 prosecutions. See United States v.
Cantrelle, No. 2:11-cr-00542-GEB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *18-23 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013).
283 134 S. Ct. at 1718, 1722-30; see infra notes 328-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision).
284 See In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009), reh g grantedsub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190
(5th Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc granted, 701 F.3d at 749, vacated andremanded sub nom. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at
1710
279
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Government had failed to establish that the defendant's conduct proximately caused any
of Amy's approximately $3.4 million loss and denied her any restitution.285 In its
mandamus review of the restitution determination, the initial appellate panel noted that
existing precedent in other circuits required a proximate causation showing for restitution
under this statute and that the Fifth Circuit had not yet construed this aspect of the
statute.286 This panel denied mandamus, finding that Amy had neither clearly nor
indisputably established the correctness of her contention that the statute did not require a
showing of proximate causation between the categories of her claimed losses and the
defendant's conduct. 287
On rehearing, a different appellate panel concluded that the trial court had clearly
and indisputably erred by requiring proximate causation as to all of Amy's losses as
opposed to only the catchall non-specific category of victim loss. The rehearing panel
granted the mandamus writ and remanded the matter for the determination of restitution
owed to Amy.288 The Fifth Circuit reheard Amy's petition en banc.28 The en banc court
recognized that the other circuits that had addressed the issue had concluded that the
sexual exploitation of children restitution statute requires a showing of proximate
causation between a defendant's criminal conduct and all categories of a victim's losses.
However, the en banc court concluded that the language and rationale of the statute
supported a limitation of the proximate causation requirement solely to the catchall
category of restitution losses.290
Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit en banc court's statutory interpretation, in order to
obtain restitution under the statute, a person must first establish victim status by
demonstrating that images possessed, received, or distributed by a defendant include an
image(s) of the individual. 291 Once victim status is established, the individual is entitled to
full restitution for all categories of losses specifically identified in the statute, e.g., medical
services and therapy, and any additional catchall categories of loss that the victim can
establish were proximately caused by the defendant's criminal conduct.292 In awarding
restitution in cases with multiple offenders, such as this, a trial court can use available

Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 794.
287 Id. at 795. But see id. at 795-98 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (finding that Amy was entitled to some amount of
restitution and supporting a remand for a determination of an appropriate amount).
288
Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d at 192-202. In addition to her mandamus petition, Amy attempted to file a direct
appeal from the trial court's restitution ruling that was assigned to this panel. Her request for rehearing of the
mandamus panel ruling was consolidated with her attempted appeal before this second appellate panel. See id. at
193-94; cf id. at 192-93 (determining there was no need to resolve the issue of a CVRA victim right to appeal
because of the grant of mandamus).
289 See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 752. In addition to the conflict between the initial and rehearing panel
opinions, another Fifth Circuit panel had addressed the same proximate causation issue in a direct appeal by an
offender in a child pornography possession case that included some images of Amy and in which the trial court
had awarded over $500,000 in restitution to Amy. See United States v. Wright, 639 F.3d 679, 681 (5th Cir.
2011), reh'g en banc granted, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012). Although the Wright panel applied the Amy
rehearing panel's interpretation that proximate causation is only required regarding the catchall loss category, it
concluded that the trial court had not adequately articulated a rationale for its restitution award, vacated the
restitution order, and remanded the case for the trial court to better explain the basis for its restitution award. See
id. at 684-86. Moreover, although they applied the Amy rehearing panel interpretation of the restitution statute
concerning proximate causation, all of the judges on the panel specially concurred to express their disagreement
with this interpretation and to urge the court to rehear both cases en banc. See id. at 686-92 (Davis, J., joined by
King and Southwick, JJ., specially concurring).
290 See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 759-72.
291 Id. at 773.
292 Id.
285
286
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statutory procedures, such as joint and several liability. 29 3 The en banc court applied its
statutory interpretation to Amy's restitution-based mandamus petition. It concluded that,
as a victim of the defendant's child pornography possession offense, Amy was entitled to
the full amount of her losses and that the trial court had clearly and indisputably erred in
awarding her no restitution.294 Thus, the appellate court granted her mandamus petition,
vacated the underlying trial court judgment, and directed the trial court to enter a
restitution order for the full amount of Amy's losses pursuant to the restitution statute. 295
The Court subsequently vacated and remanded this judgment in Paroline, as described
296
later in this section.
The Fifth Circuit also applied the traditional mandamus standards to grant
mandamus to Amy and Vicky in a child pornography possession prosecution that included
297
images of both of them. In this case, the trial court had awarded $125,000 restitution to
each petitioner (of the over $3 million sought) based on their counseling expenses for ten
years and attorneys' fees, but had not explicitly stated whether the defendant had joint and
several liability for this restitution. 298 Following the affirmance of the restitution award on
the offender's appeal, 299 the trial court granted the offender's motion for a hearing
regarding the restitution award. The trial court stated at the hearing that the previously
imposed restitution obligation was to be joint and several. It then entered an order that the
offender had no obligation to pay any of the awarded amounts of restitution because Amy
and Vicky had each already received more than $125,000 in restitution from defendants in
other cases.

300

&

See id. at 772-73 (including a description of the interplay between 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2259, 3664 (West 2000
Pamp. 2014)).
294 Id. at 773-74.
293

See id. The appellate court also found that Amy satisfied the two other criteria for mandamus, i.e., she had no
other available remedy because mandamus was her only CVRA remedy and the grant of mandamus was
appropriate in light of the court's statutory interpretation. See id. at 773; see also id. at 754-56 & n.5 (finding no
CVRA victim right to appeal); id. at 774 (affinning the award of over $500,000 restitution to Amy in the Wright
case despite the fact that it erroneously did not reflect the full amount of Amy's loss because the Government did
not appeal the sentence and Amy did not seek mandamus regarding it); id. at 774-75 (Dennis, J., concurring in
part in the judgment) (suggesting trial courts can take steps to craft restitution orders in cases with multiple
defendants pursuant to the applicable restitution statutes); cf id. at 775-80 (Davis, J., joined by King, Smith, and
Graves, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding proximate causation is required, but satisfied here;
agreeing with the remand for a determination of restitution; and disagreeing with the majority's analysis
regarding its award in cases with multiple offenders). But see id. at 780-82 (Southwick, J., dissenting) (finding
that proximate causation is required and can be shown through aggregate causation; that additional restitution
proceedings are necessary in the case; and disagreeing with the majority's analysis regarding its award in cases
with multiple offenders).
296 Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1730 (2014) (vacating and remanding the judgment); infra notes
328-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Parolinedecision).
297 See In re Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).
298 See id.; United States v. Gammon, No. 11-20902, slip op. at 2-3 & n. 1 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2013).
299 On appeal, the offender challenged the restitution order because there was no showing that the victims' losses
were proximately caused by his conduct. The appellate court rejected this challenge on the basis of its en banc
opinion in In re Amy Unknown, described supra notes 289-95 and accompanying text, and found that the
categories of the victims' losses did not require a showing of proximate causation. See Gammon, No. 11-20902,
slip op. at 3-5. The offender also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain the
reasons for the restitution amount and by not stating whether he was jointly and severally liable for the victims'
losses. The appellate court found that the trial court adequately explained the basis for its restitution award (in
the absence of a Government appeal or victim mandamus petition seeking an award of the full amount of claimed
victim loss). The appellate court also found 1) no abuse of discretion based on the trial court's failure to indicate
whether the offender's liability was joint and several; 2) that the offender's liability was limited to the amounts
of restitution awarded; and 3) that, pursuant to the restitution procedural statute, the offender could seek to
suspend restitution payments in the future if the victims were fully compensated for the full amount of their
losses by other offenders. See id., slip op. at 5-8.
300 See Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 2.
295
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In its mandamus review, the Fifth Circuit found that its previous affirmance of
the restitution award included a determination that the offender's obligation to pay
$125,000 each to Amy and Vicky was not joint and several and that the trial court
intended a restitution award separate from the victims' recovery in other cases. As a result,
the appellate court found that the traditional mandamus criteria were satisfied, including
the petitioners' clear and indisputable right to the writ. It granted the writ and ordered the
reinstatement of the original restitution award of $125,000 to each victim without regard
to any other recovery they might receive. 301
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the
child sexual exploitation restitution statute requires a showing of proximate causation
between an offender's criminal conduct and all of a victim's losses.3 02 However, applying
traditional mandamus standards, the appellate court granted Amy's mandamus petition in
part.30 3 In this case, the offender was convicted of possessing child pornography that
included one image of Amy. The trial court awarded Amy $5,000 that it characterized as
"nominal" restitution regarding the over $3.2 million she sought as her total losses from
the creation and distribution of the pornographic images of her.3 04 The trial court indicated
that the restitution amount was less than the actual harm the offender caused Amy, but that
the Government and Amy had failed to establish the specific amount of loss that was
caused by the offender's possession of the image of Amy. 3 0 5 The trial court also declined
to hold the offender jointly and severally liable for all of Amy's losses based on the
conduct of others.30 6
On mandamus review, the District of Columbia Circuit found that because the
record did not establish that the offender's conduct proximately caused all of Amy's
losses, the trial court did not clearly and indisputably err in declining to impose joint and
several liability on the offender for the full amount of Amy's losses. However, she was
entitled to the loss that the offender did proximately cause and which the trial court
acknowledged was in excess of the $5,000 restitution awarded. By awarding restitution in
an amount less than that the offender proximately caused, the trial court did clearly and
indisputably err, entitling Amy to the grant of mandamus.3 07 On remand, the District of
Columbia Circuit directed the trial court to reconsider the existing evidence presented by
the Government to establish the losses the offender's conduct proximately caused Amy or
to permit the submission of additional evidence or a formula or some "principled method"
for determining the amount of restitution owed to Amy. 308
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the child sexual exploitation restitution
statute requires a showing of proximate causation between an offender's criminal conduct

See id., slip op. at 2-3. The appellate court noted that the petitioners had already recovered more than
$125,000 each at sentencing which would have rendered the restitution award a nullity if based on joint and
several liability and that the trial court did not indicate a joint and several restitution obligation at sentencing. See
id.
302 See In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528, 534-37 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
303 See id. at 530.
304 Id.
305 See
id.
306
Id. at 530-31; cf United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540-44 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing Amy's
companion attempted direct appeal after finding no CVRA victim right or other right to appeal the restitution
award).
307 Amy, 641 F.3d
at 539-40.
308 Id. at 540; id. at 540-44 (finding that mandamus was Amy's only
adequate remedy); see supra notes 140-46
and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
301
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and all of a victim's losses. 3 09 The appellate court reached this conclusion in a mandamus
review of a trial court's award of $3,333 in restitution to Vicky as part of the offender's
receipt and distribution of child pornography sentence rather than the full amount of her
losses that included the conduct of other offenders. The amount was calculated based on
Vicky's medical care, therapy, lost income, and attorney's fees expenses after the date of
the offender's crime. 3 10 Applying traditional standards of mandamus review, the appellate
court concluded that the full amount of losses that Vicky sought included losses prior to
the commission of the offender's crime and which he could not have proximately
caused. 311 Thus, the trial court did not clearly and indisputably err in declining to award
Vicky the full amount of her losses that included these pre-crime losses. In addition, the
trial court articulated the basis for the restitution award for Vicky's post-crime losses
which the trial court found represented the full amount of her losses proximately caused
by the conduct of this offender. The Eighth Circuit found that the trial court did not clearly
312
and indisputably err in its restitution determination and denied the mandamus petition.
The Court subsequently vacated and remanded this judgment for further consideration "in
313
light of' Paroline,as described later in this section.
ii.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

Prior to the CVRA, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the child sexual
exploitation restitution statute requires a showing of proximate causation between an
offender's criminal conduct and all of a victim's losses. 3 14 In their mandamus petition,
Amy and Vicky challenged the trial court's denial of any restitution to Amy and the award
of $4,545 to Vicky for the offender's transportation of child pornography including their
images. 3 15 Utilizing its more expansive abuse of discretion or legal error review standard
and applying circuit precedent regarding the requirement of proximate causation regarding

See In re Vicky, 709 F.3d 712, 720-22 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remandedsub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S.
Ct. 1934 (2014). But see id. at 723-28 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that
proximate causation is only required for the catchall category of restitution loss).
310 See id. at 715. Vicky sought from the offender her full losses of over $1.2 million minus the almost $300,000
she had already recovered from other defendants. The trial court awarded restitution of almost $20,000 and found
that proximate causation was only required for the catchall restitution category. On the offender's appeal, the
Government agreed that proximate causation was required regarding all losses. The appellate court remanded the
matter for the reconsideration of restitution. On remand, the trial court calculated an amount of restitution based
on Vicky's medical care, therapy, lost income, and attorney's fees expenses after the date of the offender's
crime. See id.
311 See id. at 718-20; supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf United
States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 715-18 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Vicky,
134 S. Ct. at 1934 (dismissing Vicky's companion attempted direct appeal after finding no CVRA victim right or
other right to appeal the restitution award).
312 See Vicky, 709 F.3d at 722-23. But see id. at 723-28 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(finding that proximate causation is only required for the catchall category of restitution loss and supporting the
grant of the petition and remand for entry of restitution in the full amount of Vicky's loss).
313 Vicky, 134 S. Ct. at 1934; see infra note 337 and accompanying text.
314 See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
315 See In re Amy & Vicky, 698 F.3d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Amy and
Vicky v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959 (2014). In the trial court, Amy sought restitution for losses of $3
million and Vicky sought restitution for over $225,000. The trial court had initially awarded restitution to Amy
and Vicky based on $1,000 per image of them that the offender had on his computer, resulting in $17,000 for
Amy and $48,000 for Vicky. On the offender's direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit expanded the discussion of its
prior precedent regarding the required proximate causation for restitution under the statute. It concluded that the
Government had not proven that the offender's crime proximately caused the victims' losses, such proof needed
to support an award of any restitution. The appellate court also questioned whether the formula the trial court
used to determine the amount of restitution was an adequate measure of victim loss. The appellate court vacated
the restitution award and remanded the matter for a redetermination regarding restitution. See United States v.
Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1254-56, 1259-66 (9th Cir. 2011).
309
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victim loss, the Ninth Circuit denied the mandamus petition.3 16 The Court subsequently
vacated and remanded this judgment for further consideration "in light of' Paroline, as
described later in this section.317
In a separate Ninth Circuit-based prosecution, Amy sought over $3.3 million and
Vicky sought over $1.3 million for losses associated with the offender's child
pornography distribution conviction that included Amy and Vicky in at least one of the
images he distributed. 31 8 The presentence report did not recommend restitution based on
the lack of information establishing a causal connection between the offender's conduct
and the victims' losses. In the absence of any additional evidence by the Government or
the victims establishing such a causal connection, the trial court did not order restitution to
Amy and Vicky.31 9

In its mandamus review of the restitution denial, the Ninth Circuit found that the
trial court did not err in requiring a showing of proximate causation in determining
restitution, pursuant to circuit precedent, and denied the petition in this regard.3 20
However, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
any restitution to Amy and Vicky.3 2 1 Contrary to the presentence report recommendation

adopted by the trial court, the appellate court found that the petitioners had offered
sufficient record evidence to establish the required causal connection between their losses
and the offender's crime.32 2 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit granted the mandamus petition,
in part, and remanded the matter for the vacation of the restitution aspect of the judgment
and a determination of the amount of restitution owed to Amy and Vicky.32 3
On remand, the trial court reviewed the victims' claimed losses, made some
adjustments, and then deducted from the pool of each victim's remaining total losses any
losses that were specifically traceable to another defendant's conduct and any losses that
predated the defendant's conduct. To determine the offender's share of the victims' losses,
the court then divided the resulting sums by the number of restitution orders in other
prosecutions associated with the victims' images. This formula resulted in a restitution
award of $2,881 for Vicky and $17,307 for Amy.

324

In their mandamus proceeding regarding these restitution awards, Amy and
Vicky contended that the trial court had used an "improper methodology" to determine the
restitution amounts and the court should have imposed joint and several liability on the
defendant for all of their losses. 325 The Ninth Circuit found that 1) the imposition of joint
and several liability was not expressly authorized in the applicable restitution statutes; 2)
the Ninth Circuit had not yet determined the appropriate method for calculating restitution
pursuant to the child sexual exploitation statute; and 3) a conflict in the circuits existed on
See Amy & Vicky, 698 F.3d at 1152-53 (declining the petitioners' request to overrule its proximate causation
precedent and adopt the Fifth Circuit interpretation that proximate causation is only required regarding the
catchall category of statutory losses).
317 See Amy and Vicky, 134 S. Ct. at 1959; infra note 338 and accompanying text.
318 See United States v. Cantrelle, No. 2:11-cr-00542-GEB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2013).
319 Id. at *3-5.
320 See In re Amy & Vicky, 710 F.3d 985, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining the petitioners' request to overrule
its proximate causation precedent and adopt the Fifth Circuit interpretation that proximate causation is only
required regarding the catchall category of statutory losses).
321 Id. at 987.
36

322
323
324
325

See id.
See id.

See Cantrelle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *10-27.
In re Amy & Vicky, 714 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013).
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this issue with the weight of the authority declining to impose joint and several liability.3 26
As a result, the trial court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion by declining to
impose joint and several liability on the defendant for all of the victims' losses. The Ninth
Circuit therefore denied the mandamus petition.3 27
iii. Court Resolution of the CausationIssue

Almost ten years after the enactment of the CVRA and twenty years after the
enactment of the child sexual exploitation restitution statute, the Court granted certiorari,

in Parolinev. United States,328 the Fifth Circuit en banc case involving Amy's images, to

resolve the conflict that had developed between the circuits regarding the proximate
causation requirement.329 The Paroline Court concluded that the proximate causation
requirement applies to all categories of loss described in the statute and that restitution
under the statute is thus "proper" only to the degree that an offender's crime proximately
caused a victim's loss. 330 The Court, however, recognized the challenges of applying this
proximate causation requirement, and the accompanying actual causation requirement, in
cases like Amy's in which hundreds or thousands of individuals might have participated in
creating her losses and in which attributing specific losses to an individual offender
331
through traditional causal analysis might not be possible.
In this "special context," the Paroline Court concluded that courts applying the
statute should award restitution in an amount that reflects a defendant's "relative role in
the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses."332 Although the Court
entrusted the application of these interpretive principles and the resulting determination of
restitution in these circumstances to the discretion of the trial courts, it suggested possible
factors a trial court might consider in determining a specific offender's relative role in the
overall causal process resulting in a victim's losses. For example, after first determining a
victim's overall losses from the continuing distribution of pornographic images of the
victim, the Court stated that a trial court could consider the estimated number of
prosecuted and not yet prosecuted offenders engaged in related conduct generating the
losses as well as factors concerning the defendant's individual conduct (e.g., possession
vs. distribution of images, the number of images of the victim involved, and any
connection to the images' production).33 3 The Paroline Court stated that a restitution
amount based on a consideration of such types of factors would be deemed the amount of
a victim's overall losses that were the "proximate result" of an offender's crime and the
"full amount" of the losses owed to the victim under the statute. 334
326

Id. at 1167-68; cf id. (declining the petitioners' request to overrule its proximate causation precedent)

327

See id.

134 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (2014).
The Court identified the conflict as one "over the proper causation inquiry for purposes of determining the
entitlement to and amount of restitution" under the child sexual exploitation restitution statute. Id. The Fifth
Circuit's position applying a proximate causation requirement only to the catchall category of loss conflicted
with decisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits that applied a proximate causation requirement to all losses under the statute. See id. at 1719
(citing cases).
328

329

330
331
332

See id. at 1718-22.
See id. at 1722-27.
Id. at 1727.

Id. at 1727-28.
Id. at 1728 (applying 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 2000)). But see id. at 1730-35 (Roberts, C.J., joinedby Scalia
and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (finding that the statute requires actual and proximate causation between a
defendant's conduct and a victim's loss and that no actual causation was shown here that would support a
restitution award); id. at 1735-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (supporting an aggregate causation interpretation
that would permit restitution in the full amount of a victim's losses from each defendant).
333
334
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The Paroline Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
restitution statute's requirements was "incorrect" and that the trial court in the matter had
erred in requiring a "strict showing of but-for causation." 3 3 5 The Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit judgment granting mandamus and remanded the matter for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.33 6 The Court subsequently vacated-and remanded for further
consideration "in light of' Paroline-the judgments related to the Eighth Circuit's denial
of mandamus to Vicky3 37 and the Ninth Circuit's denial of mandamus to Amy and Vicky
in their initial mandamus action there.33 8
3.

Participation Rights

The CVRA includes four crime victim participatory rights regarding notice, an
opportunity to confer with the prosecutor and to be heard, and an exemption from
exclusion from court proceedings for testifying victims. The notice right provides crime
victims the right to "reasonable, accurate, and timely notice" of public court proceedings
and parole proceedings concerning the crime or the defendant's release or escape. 33 9 The
CVRA provides crime victims the "reasonable right to confer" with the prosecutor in the
case. 340 The right of testifying victims not to be excluded from public court proceedings is
granted unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a victim's testimony
would be "materially altered" if the crime victim heard other testimony at the applicable
proceeding. 341 The CVRA right to be "reasonably heard" relates to public proceedings in
the trial court regarding release, plea, and sentencing and parole proceedings. 342The
federal appellate circuits have reviewed mandamus petitions regarding each of these
participatory rights, with the most petitions concerning the right to be reasonably heard.3 43
Id. at 1730.
Id.; see supra notes 284-96 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
337 See Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014); supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition).
338 See Amy and Vicky v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959 (2014); supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
3
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (a)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3)-(5).
340 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5).
341 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3771(a)(3), (b)(1); see Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right to
Attend the Trial: The ReascendantNational Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 481 (2005).
342 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4); see 150 CONG. REC. S4,267-68 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon
Kyl and Dianne Feinstein) (describing the participatory rights); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-12 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); cf Aaronson, supra note 8, at 646-62; Richard A. Bierschbach,
Allocution and the Purposes of Victim ParticipationUnder the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 44 (2006); Russell
P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need to Know Regarding Crime Victims' ParticipatoryRights in
Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 21 (2006); Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rightsfor
Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 432 (2008); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 597-610; Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims'Rights in an Adversary
System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237 (2008) (describing the participatory rights).
343 See infra notes 344-428 and accompanying text. In addition to the mandamus petitions regarding these
participatory rights, the appellate courts have addressed three petitions relying exclusively on "[t]he right to be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8); In re
K.K., 756 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion or legal error by trial court's denial of
motions to quash, but requiring an initial in camera review of documents); In re Zito, No. 09-70554 (9th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2009) (finding the in camera review of subpoenaed documents was not a "cognizable hann" to the
petitioner); In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding a clear and indisputable right to a writ due to the
trial court's three-month delay in ruling on the petitioner's motion to unseal and directing the trial court to make
a ruling within two weeks); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon
Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein); Kyl
et al., supranote 8, at 613-14 (describing this right). Petitioners have also asserted this right in connection with
other rights raised. See In re Olesen, 447 F. App'x 868 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir.
2008); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005).
335
36
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The Rights to Notice and to Confer with the Prosecutor
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

The Second Circuit considered two petitioner groups' claims that their rights to
notice and to confer with the prosecutor had been violated regarding a securities fraud
prosecution in In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. 3 44 The Government had asserted

that it was impossible to identify and personally notify each of the tens of thousands of
affected victims of the proposed settlement in the case.345 It sought authorization to use
alternative notification procedures pursuant to the CVRA provision concerning
prosecutions with multiple victims, including notification through the related bankruptcy
and civil proceedings, a nationally televised press conference and a press release through
media outlets, and postings on the prosecutor's office web site. The Government engaged
in all of these notifications regarding the proposed settlement. The trial court also ordered
written submissions by persons or entities desiring to be heard regarding the proposed
settlement.3 46 After the due date for these submissions, at the hearing scheduled to rule on
the Government's motion to utilize the alternative notifications, the Government informed
the trial court of the notification actions it had taken. At this proceeding, the petitioners
objected to the proposed settlement agreement, but the trial court accepted the settlement
agreement subject to approval by the judges in the related proceedings.34 7
On mandamus review, the Second Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that, in light of the time delays and challenges of identifying
victims and calculating related losses, the Government had given "reasonable notice" to
victims of the proposed settlement through the alternative notification methods used.34 8
The appellate court found that no petitioner had requested and been denied an opportunity
to confer with the prosecutor in the case. 349 The Second Circuit stated that "[n]othing in
the CVRA requires the Government to seek approval from crime victims before
negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement." 350 Instead, the CVRA gave the
petitioners an opportunity to be heard regarding the proposed settlement agreement, which
they received. In denying the mandamus petition, the Huff court found that the trial court

The appellate courts have also addressed two petitions raising claims regarding "unreasonable delay"
in the proceedings. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(7); In re Thaler, No. 13-40171 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013)
(dismissing as moot a mandamus petition challenging the nine-year delay in the resolution of a habeas corpus
petition because the trial court took action and denied the underlying petition); Olesen, 447 F. App'x at 868
(finding no clear and indisputable right to a writ based on delay in resolution of habeas corpus proceeding); see
also 150 CONG. REc. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,268-69
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 611-13
(describing this right).
The appellate courts have not yet addressed any petitions asserting the right to be "reasonably
protected" from the defendant. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,267 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 595-97 (describing this right).
344 409 F.3d at 555.
345 Id. at 559.
346 id
347 Id
at 559-60; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(2); supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing options in
cases involving multiple crime victims).
348 WER. HuffAssetMgmt Co.,
409 F.3d at 564.
349 id
350 Id
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had engaged in "extensive successful efforts to provide notice of the proposed settlement
and to solicit and hear objections to it." 3 5 1
ii.

TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

In In re Dean,352 the Fifth Circuit also considered an alternative notification
procedure concerning a plea agreement and its impact on victims' rights to notice and to
confer with the prosecutor.3 5 3 The Government filed an ex parte motion in the trial court
seeking to establish alternative CVRA procedures in light of the large number of crime
victims in the underlying industrial explosion-related prosecution and the potential
accompanying media coverage that could harm the plea negotiation process.3 5 4 The trial
court entered an ex parte order that permitted the Government to enter into a plea
agreement with the defendant without prior notice to the crime victims. Pursuant to this
order, the crime victims were notified of the agreement before the plea's entry in court.3 55
The crime victims had and exercised opportunities to express their opposition to the plea
agreement. The trial court denied their request that it reject the plea agreement based on
asserted violations of their CVRA rights to notice, confer with the prosecutor, and
fairness. 356 The petitioners filed a mandamus petition seeking that the trial court's decision
be reversed and the matter be remanded with instructions that the plea agreement not be
accepted at that time. The Fifth Circuit initially granted the mandamus petition, in part, to
stay further trial court actions to "effect the plea agreement" pending further order of the
appellate court.357
The Fifth Circuit found that "Congress made the policy decision [in the
CVRA]-which we are bound to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform the plea
negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached." 3 58
In this prosecution involving less than 200 victims, the Dean court concluded that it was
not "impracticable" for the Government to notify the victims of the plea discussions and to
permit the crime victims to "communicate meaningfully" with the prosecutor before the
plea agreement was reached. 359 The trial court therefore misapplied the CVRA and the
alternative procedure it approved violated the victims' CVRA rights to notice and to
confer with the prosecutor.3 6 0

351
352
353
354
355

Id.; cf supra notes 48-59, 254-60 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392-93.

Id. at 393; see United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (describing the trial court proceedings).
357 Dean, 527 F.3d at 392-93.
358 Id. at 395.
356

359

Id.

Id.; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing
options in cases involving multiple crime victims). The appellate court stated that the Government should have
found a "reasonable way" to inform the victims of the likely criminal charges and find out their views regarding
the potential plea bargain. Dean, 527 F.3d at 394. The appellate court found that the stated reasons for the ex
parte order's alternative notification procedure, i.e., the number of victims and the possible impairment of the
plea negotiations, did not "pass muster." The Government had not claimed that identification and notification of
the victims would be too difficult or expensive and, in fact, suggested a notification procedure to be implemented
36
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However, the Dean court also found that the victims were allowed "substantial
and meaningful participation" at the plea proceeding and thereafter to convey their
opposition to the plea agreement to the trial court.36 1 In ultimately denying the writ under
the traditional mandamus standards, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its issuance would not
be "appropriate under the circumstances" of the case.36 2 Finding that the decision to grant
mandamus is "largely prudential[,] [w]e conclude that the better course is to deny relief,
confident that the district court will take heed that the victims have not been accorded their
full rights under the CVRA and will carefully consider their objections and briefs as this
matter proceeds" in the court's determination whether to accept the plea agreement.3 63
b.

The Rights to be Heard and not to be Excluded from Proceedings
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

In Kenna v. UnitedStates District Court,3 64 the matter in which the Ninth Circuit
established its abuse of discretion or legal error review standard for CVRA mandamus
petitions, the appellate court reviewed a petitioner's challenge to the trial court's denial of
365
his asserted CVRA right to be orally heard at sentencing. This prosecution involved
father and son co-defendants whose investment fraud resulted in victim losses of almost
after the plea agreement was signed. Id. at 394-95. The appellate court also rejected the stated concern about
impairment of the plea negotiation process as a basis for the alternative notification procedure:
In making that observation [about the impairment of plea negotiations], the court missed the purpose
of the CVRA's right to confer. In passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision-which we
are bound to enforce-that victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process by conferring
with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached. That is not an infringement, as the district court
believed, on the government's independent prosecutorial discretion; instead, it is only a requirement
that the government confer in some reasonable way with the victims before ultimately exercising
that broad discretion.
Id. at 395 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit stated that it did not matter whether the victims' exercise of their
conferral right "impair[ed]" or facilitated the plea negotiation process-" [t]he Act gives the right to confer." Id.
361 Dean, 527 F.3d at 395-96.
362 Id. at 395.
363 Id. at 396; see supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf United States
v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (accepting the plea agreement).
The Sixth Circuit applied traditional mandamus standards to deny a petition asserting a right to notice prior
to the filing of charges in the case and "direct involvement" in the negotiation of the plea agreement. The
appellate court found the asserted right to notice "uncertain" and not a ground for relief in this case in which the
petitioners were given a "full opportunity" for participation, beginning at the arraignment and continuing
throughout the proceedings. In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir. 2010); see supra notes 131-35, 273-76
and accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf Dean, 527 F.3d at 394; Crime Victims RightsAct of2004:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

111th Cong. 53, 56-57 (2009) (testimony and statement of Susan Howley, Director of Public Policy, National
Center for Victims of Crime); 157 CONG. REC. S7,359-60 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2011) (letter of Assistant Attorney
General Ronald Weich); 157 CONG. REC. S7,060-61 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 CONG.
REc. S3,607-09 (daily ed. June 8, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 8, 41-42 (rev. 2012); Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims'
Rights During Criminal Investigations?Applying the Crime Victims' Rights Act Before Criminal Charges are

Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (2014); Elliot Smith, Comment, Is There a Pre-ChargeConferral
Right in the CVRA?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407 (discussing applicability of the CVRA prior to the initiation of
formal charges).
364 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006).
365
Id. at 1013.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/5

48

Tobolowsky: Mandamus Muddle: The Mandamus Review Standard for the Federal Cri
2015]

MANDAMUS MUDDLE

171

$100 million.366 More than 60 victims submitted written victim impact statements and the
petitioner and several other victims orally addressed the trial court at the father's
sentencing. 367 However, the judge did not permit the petitioner or other victims to make
oral presentations at the son's sentencing three months later. In declining their requests to
speak, the judge stated that he had listened to the victims at the first sentencing, rereviewed the impact statements, did not think there was any additional information that
would impact the son's sentencing, and would receive any new victim-related information
through the prosecutor. 3681
In this first mandamus review concerning the CVRA right to be heard, the Ninth
Circuit found that the CVRA statutory text was not dispositive and hence was ambiguous
regarding whether a crime victim's right to be heard included a right to be orally heard or
only a right to make the victim's "position known by whatever means the court reasonably
determines." 3 6 9 To resolve this ambiguity, the Kenna court reviewed the legislative history
of the CVRA and the proposed victim's rights constitutional amendment that used the
same language, and found that it revealed a "clear congressional intent to give crime
victims the right to speak" at the proceedings designated in the CVRA. 3 7 0 The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that this interpretation, i.e., that victims have an "indefeasible right
to speak" at sentencing (like the prosecutor and the defendant), advanced the CVRA's
371
purpose to make crime victims "full participants" in the criminal justice process.
Thus, the Kenna court found that the petitioner's CVRA right to orally address
the court at the co-defendant son's sentencing was not satisfied by the petitioner's oral
address at the father's sentencing.3 72 The appellate court observed that the trial court's
denial of the petitioner's CVRA right to be heard might satisfy its circuit's traditional
mandamus review standard. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was not required to
make that determination because the trial court clearly erred and thereby satisfied the
review standard it had adopted for CVRA mandamus review.3 73 The Kenna court thus
granted the petitioner's writ and authorized the petitioner and other victims to pursue a
CVRA motion in the trial court to re-open the sentencing proceeding. 3 74 If granted, the

See id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
369 Id. at 1013-15. The Ninth Circuit not only addressed the differing interpretations of the CVRA right to be
heard presented by the petitioner and the trial court, but also addressed the differing interpretations of the two
other trial courts that had previously addressed the issue. Id.; compare United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp.
2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005), with United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
370 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1015-16.
371 Id. at 1016. The appellate court noted the petitioner's concession that the CVRA permits a trial court to "place
reasonable constraints on the duration and content of victims' speech, such as avoiding undue delay, repetition or
the use of profanity" and further noted the potential application of the CVRA's provision regarding alternative
procedures in prosecutions with multiple victims. Id. at 1014 & n.1 (referencing 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1(d)(2) (West
Pamp. 2014)); cf id. at 1018-19 (Friedman, J., dubitante) (agreeing with the application of the CVRA right to
speak in the instant case, but expressing concern about the "broad sweep" of the opinion's language regarding an
"absolute" CVRA right to speak regardless of the circumstances and its application to victims in the instant case
beyond the petitioner).
372 Id. at 1016-17 (finding a CVRA victim right to "confront every defendant who has wronged them" at
potentially multiple sentencings and have the victim's then current impact information considered at the time of
the imposition of punishment).
373 Id. at 1017.
374 Id. at 1017-18 (referencing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) regarding re-opening sentencing proceedings).
366

367
368
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trial court was required to conduct a new sentencing hearing at which the petitioner and
other victims would be permitted to speak, as described in the appellate court's opinion.3 75
This petitioner subsequently filed a CVRA mandamus petition with the Ninth
Circuit seeking release of the defendant son's entire presentence report, after the trial court
rejected the petitioner's assertion that the CVRA provides crime victims a "general right"
to obtain disclosure of the report.37 6 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court's
position after finding that neither the CVRA statute's text nor its legislative history
supported the petitioner's position.3 77 The appellate court additionally noted that the trial
court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his reasons for requesting the
report outweighed its confidentiality and had refused to consider the trial court's offer to
consider disclosing specific parts of the report. 3 78 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error and denied the writ. 3 7 9
The Ninth Circuit granted aspects of two writs regarding the CVRA right not to
be excluded from specified public proceedings by requiring trial court determinations, by
clear and convincing evidence, as to whether individual victims could be excluded
because their testimony would be "materially altered" by their presence in court. 38 0 In In
re Parker,381the trial court had determined that 34 witnesses did not satisfy the CVRA's
crime victim definition and thus could be excluded from court proceedings based on
traditional practices involving witnesses.3 82 The Ninth Circuit found that the trial court had
erred in its determination of victim status and granted the mandamus petition.3 8 3 The
appellate court further instructed the trial court to vacate its order excluding the victimwitnesses and to conduct proceedings to make individualized findings regarding the
presence or exclusion of each of the 34 victim-witnesses pursuant to the CVRA.3 84
The other Ninth Circuit petition, In re Mikhel,38 5 was filed by the Government
regarding a kidnaping and murder prosecution in which the prosecutor had filed an
unopposed motion in limine to permit the murder victims' families to be present during
the entire trial despite the fact that some of them would be testifying.
Citing concerns
about "collusive" witness testimony and "proper" courtroom decorum, the trial court

375

Id; see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf Amy Baron-Evans,

Traps for the Unwary Under the Crime Victims'Rights Act: Lessons the Kenna Case, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 49

(2006); Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act: Judge
Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassellin Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 36 (2006).
376 In re Kenna, 453 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
377id
378

id

37

Id; see Matthew B. Riley, Note, Victim Participationin the CriminalJustice System: In re Kenna and Victim

Access to PresentenceReports, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 235 (2007).

See infra notes 381-92 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3),
(b)(1) (West Pamp. 2014).
381 Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
10270 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009).
380

382

Id. at

1.

id
384 See id.; supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition); see also In re Parker, Nos. 0970529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7158, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2009); United States v. W.R. Grace, CR
05-07-M-DWM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124996, at *1-2 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) (describing the trial court's
compliance responses).
385 453 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
386
Id. at 1138.
383
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denied the motion and prohibited testifying family members to be present in court prior to
their testimony.38 7

In response to the Government's mandamus petition seeking that the testifying
family members be permitted to observe the entire trial, the Ninth Circuit noted the
traditional rule regarding courtroom exclusion of witnesses incorporated in Rule 615 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 38 8 However, the appellate court stated that Rule 615's
exception regarding persons "authorized by statute to be present" was satisfied by the
CVRA's crime victim right not to be excluded from designated proceedings unless there
was clear and convincing evidence establishing a risk that the victim's testimony would be
"materially altered" and unless "reasonable alternatives" to exclusion were considered.3 89
Moreover, the appellate court stated that there must be a "highly likely" risk of altered
testimony to warrant CVRA victim-witness exclusion.390 The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that the CVRA "abrogated" Rule 615 with regard to crime victims and
effectively replaced it with the exclusion procedure prescribed by the CVRA-which the
trial court had not performed before summarily excluding the victim-witnesses from the
proceedings.391 Rather than ordering the trial court to permit the victim-witnesses to be
present, the Ninth Circuit granted the Government's petition, in part, and remanded the
matter for the trial court to conduct the exclusion analysis required by the CVRA and
described in its opinion.39 2
In addressing a CVRA petition asserting a crime victim's right to be heard in In
re Zackey, 9 3 the Third Circuit stated that it did not need to determine the applicable
review standard because the petitioner was not entitled to relief even under the "more
expansive" abuse of discretion standard.3 94 In this fraud prosecution, the trial court denied
the petitioner's motion to permit his lawyer to enter an appearance and represent him at
sentencing. The trial court recognized the petitioner's right to be heard regarding the
defendant's sentence (which he was free to exercise). However, the trial court found that
the CVRA did not require a victim's legal representation when exercising his right to be
heard or require a victim's lawyer to be permitted to speak during sentencing or other
proceedings.3 9 5 The trial court concluded that the prosecutor's assistance would be
"sufficient" to determine an appropriate sentence.39 6
On mandamus review, the Third Circuit observed that the prosecutor had already
requested restitution and attorney's fees on the victim's behalf, had represented he would
seek the upward sentencing guideline departure requested by the victim, and had not
entered into any agreements that would prevent full advocacy at sentencing on behalf of
the defendant's victims. 397 The Zackey court concluded that the petitioner's CVRA rights
387 Id.; see also id.
because the CVRA
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771
388
Id. at 1139.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 See id. at 1140;

at 1138 n.1 (stating that it was proper for the Government to file the mandamus petition
authorized the prosecutor, as well as the victim, to assert the CVRA rights, and referencing
(d)(1) (West Pamp. 2014)).

id. at 1139 n.4 (expressing no opinion regarding the merits of the exclusion claims in the
absence of record evidence regarding the proposed testimony of the victim-witnesses); FED. R. EvID. 615; cf
United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1056 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (permitting presence of victimwitnesses).
393 No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010).

Id. at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
396 Id. at *2.
394
395

397

Id. at * 2-3.
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were ensured by these measures and would not be "diluted in the absence of individual
counsel." 398 The Third Circuit found that the trial court had properly recognized the
petitioner's sentencing interests; that the prosecutor had "assumed responsibility" for
securing the petitioner's CVRA rights; and that the trial court had properly exercised its
"discretionary powers" in denying the appearance motion of the petitioner's lawyer. It
therefore denied the petition.39 9
ii.

TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

Prior to expressly adopting the traditional mandamus review standard, the
Eleventh Circuit granted a CVRA mandamus petition and ordered the trial court to
recognize the petitioner home buyers as CVRA victims of the defendant's mortgage
brokerage fee-related fraud. The appellate court's grant of mandamus also included an
order to the trial court to afford the petitioners their CVRA rights, including the right to be
heard that the petitioners had sought to exercise in In re Stewart.400
In In re Aquino, 40 1 the Eleventh Circuit denied another petition concerning

CVRA victim status and the right to be heard.40 2 The appellate court found that the
petitioners had not demonstrated that the trial court had made clearly erroneous factual
findings or misapplied the law to the findings regarding the defendant's sentencing
hearing. 403 Assuming arguendo that the petitioners were eligible CVRA crime victims, the
trial court had afforded them the right to be "reasonably heard" by postponing the
sentencing to give them additional time to establish their CVRA victim status and by
permitting them to provide written statements to be considered at sentencing. 404 The
petitioners failed to provide support to establish their victim status or to submit the
permitted statements as of the defendant's sentencing.4 0 5 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the petitioners had not established their entitlement to relief under "any potentially
applicable standard of review" and denied their petition.40 6
In a consolidated appeal and CVRA mandamus petition in In re Siler,407 the Sixth
Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners
access to the presentence reports from a previous prosecution in which they were CVRA
victims. 4 08 The petitioners had sought the presentence reports in connection with a civil
suit filed eighteen months after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.409 The trial
398

Id. at *3.

399 Id. at *2-4; see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
40 552 F.3d 1285, 1286-89 (11th Cir. 2008); see supra notes 152-55, 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing

this petition).
401 No. 12-11757-B (11th Cir.
Apr. 6, 2012).
402 Id., slip op.
at 1-2.
43 Id., slip op. at 1.
44 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
40 Id., slip op. at 2

Id., slip op. at 2 n. 1 (stating that the circuit had not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard); see
supra notes 159, 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
In their CVRA petition in the District of Columbia Circuit, the petitioners sought to be heard prior to
the acceptance of the plea and proposed plea agreement in the prosecution. Finding that the trial judge had not
yet accepted the plea or plea agreement and had stated that he would not do so without hearing from the victims,
the appellate court denied the CVRA petition as moot under either the traditional or more expansive review
standard. See In re Jacobsen, No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005); supra notes
138-39 and accompanying text (finding the petition should be denied under either review standard).
407 571 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2009).
406

408

409

Id. at 611.

Id. at 607.
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court rejected their claim that the CVRA supported the reports' release to them and
concluded that the CVRA did not provide crime victims a "general right" to obtain
presentence reports.4 10 In addition, the trial court found that these reports are generally not
available to non-parties in the prosecution and the petitioners had not demonstrated any
special need for access to the reports in this matter.4 11
At the outset, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the petitioners' requests for access
to presentence reports in a completed criminal prosecution fell outside the CVRA's "scope
of protection" and the trial court's authority pursuant to the CVRA.4 12 Even if the trial
court retained authority to release the reports, the appellate court found that the CVRA
provides no independent victim right to obtain presentence reports and thus did not require
disclosure in this matter. Even if the CVRA were interpreted to include a right of access to
presentence reports, the petitioners' request of the reports for use in a civil suit subsequent
to the completed criminal proceedings would be outside of the CVRA's scope. The
petitioners presented no evidence of their "special need" or other adequate basis for
obtaining the nonpublic, confidential reports. 41 3 The Sixth Circuit found that the trial court
had appropriately weighed the petitioners' need for the presentence reports against the
need to maintain the reports' confidentiality and had not abused its discretion in denying
the petitioners' request. Concluding that the trial court had "properly" denied the request
for the presentence reports, the Siler court affirmed the trial court's denial order and it
denied the mandamus petition.4 1 4
iii.

"Standardless" Review Circuits
415

In In re Brock, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a mandamus petition asserting
violations of an assault victim's rights to be heard and treated with fairness in connection
with the defendants' sentencing. 416 Although he had materials that summarized the
presentence reports, the petitioner requested disclosure of parts of the presentence reports
themselves regarding restitution, sentencing guideline calculations, and upward
417
departures, two days before the defendants' sentencing.
The reports are confidential,
with access limited to the court and parties to the prosecution. The trial court denied this
request at the sentencing hearing, concluding that the petitioner had sufficient information
to make his victim impact statement without the presentence reports. 418 The trial court
permitted the petitioner to add his oral impact presentation to submitted written impact
and restitution materials, but declined to hear his testimony or arguments regarding the
guidelines calculations. 411
On mandamus review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it did not need to
determine the applicable CVRA review standard because the petitioner was not entitled to
relief even under the "more relaxed" abuse of discretion standard. 4 2 0 The Brock court
Id. at 608.
See id. at 607-08 (reflecting additionally that the petitioners had not conducted discovery in their civil suit
and sought to use the presentence reports as evidence in the civil suit).
412 Id. at 609.
410
411

413

Id. at 609-11.

Id. at 611; cf id. at 608-09 (discussing the petitioners' ability to appeal the trial court order under the facts of
this case).
4
262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir. 2008).
414

416
417

Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A § 3552(d) (West 2000), FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(2), and a local court rule regarding
access to the presentence reports).
419 See id.
420 Id. at 512; see supra notes 176-78 and accompanying
text (discussing the review standard).
418
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rejected the petitioner's assertion that, without access to the reports, he had insufficient
information to meaningfully exercise his CVRA right to be heard. The appellate court
found that he had "ample" sentencing-related information and found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's denial of his access to portions of the presentence reports.4 2 1
In light of the petitioner's ability to offer written and oral impact and related information
to the court and the judge's statement that the guideline calculations did not affect the
sentence imposed, the Brock court found that the trial court's refusal to consider the
petitioner's guideline-related arguments did not prevent him from being reasonably heard
or fairly treated. Finally, the appellate court characterized the petitioner's attempt to
challenge the trial court's guideline calculations as a crime victim attempt to appeal the
defendant's sentence, which is not authorized by the CVRA. Concluding that the
petitioner was both reasonably heard and fairly treated, the Fourth Circuit denied the
mandamus petition.4 22

In In re Bustos,423 the Seventh Circuit addressed the trial court's denial of a
motion to intervene in the underlying securities fraud prosecution by the petitioner and
other investors who disagreed with aspects of the court-appointed receiver's proposed
agreements.4 24 The appellate court found that the CVRA does not provide a crime victim
right to intervene in the prosecution, but instead ensures that victims are "heard out":
"Giving victims a voice in the criminal process differs from giving them a veto power,
which often is both the goal and the effect of intervention." 4 25 The appellate court found
that the trial court had not "refused to listen" to the victims, and that the petitioner's and
others' requests had in fact resulted in some modifications of the receiver's proposals.4 26
The appellate court found no "concrete" violations of the CVRA identified in the petition,
but noted that mandamus remained available if the trial court refused to accept victim
comments during future court proceedings4. 427 However, the petitioner's anticipated
opposition to the receiver's final proposal did not constitute a CVRA violation or a basis
for intervention.4 28
C.

The Impact of the MandamusReview Standardon the CVRA Petition Outcomes

Of the 73 mandamus petitions resolved in the ten years since the enactment of the
CVRA, the federal appellate courts have denied or dismissed 62 petitions (85%) and
granted 11 petitions (15%) to some degree. The appellate courts denied or dismissed 23 of
the petitions (indicated with an "*" in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table) with
limited discussion on the ground that the petitioners' claims were not properly raised
pursuant to the CVRA, e.g., petitioners attempting to raise claims in connection with civil
proceedings. The appellate circuit's CVRA mandamus review standard consequently did
not affect the outcome of these petitions. Focusing on the remaining 50 petitions in which
the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed specific claims raised pursuant to
the CVRA, the federal appellate courts have denied 39 petitions (78%) and granted 11
Brock, 262 F. App'x at 512.
See id. at 512-13.
423 No. 10-2752 (7th Cir.
July 26, 2010).
424 Id., slip op.
at 1.
425 Id., slip op. at 1-2; see also id., slip op. at 2 (finding it unnecessary
to decide if victim intervention in a
prosecution is ever appropriate and questioning dicta in In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2009), regarding
this).
426 Id., slip op.
at 2.
427 id
428 See id. In another petition, the Seventh Circuit found a petitioner
had been allowed to participate in the
proceedings and there had been no violation of the petitioner's right to be heard as of yet in a petition filed "to
preserve [the petitioner's] objections." See In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12, 2006).
421

422
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petitions (22%) to some degree. 4 29 As discussed in this section and assessed in multiple
ways, the appellate circuit's CVRA mandamus review standard has had a limited impact
on the outcomes of these 50 petitions.
Reviewing the denial rate alone, an appellate circuit's adoption of a more
expansive mandamus review standard does not automatically guarantee a lower
mandamus denial rate. The Second Circuit's application of its abuse of discretion standard
in the 3 mandamus petitions it has reviewed has resulted in a denial rate of 100%. Using
its abuse of discretion or legal error review standard, the Ninth Circuit has granted 5 of the
13 mandamus petitions it has reviewed, resulting in a denial rate of 62%. If one includes
the Third Circuit in the category of more expansive mandamus review standards, its denial
rate is 100% based on the sole petition it has reviewed. Collectively, the denial rate for the
appellate circuits that have adopted more expansive CVRA mandamus review standards is
71%.430

The mandamus denial rate in the appellate circuits that have adopted traditional
mandamus review standards is somewhat higher. The Fifth Circuit has denied 7 of the 10
reviewed petitions (70%). The Sixth Circuit has denied 3 of the 4 reviewed petitions
(75%). The Eighth Circuit has denied the sole petition it has reviewed (100%). The Tenth

Circuit has denied all 4 petitions it has reviewed (100%). The Eleventh Circuit has denied
5 of the 6 petitions it has reviewed (83%). The District of Columbia Circuit has denied 2
of the 3 petitions it has reviewed (67%). Collectively, the denial rate for the circuits that
have adopted traditional mandamus review standards is 79%.431
The mandamus denial rate in the appellate circuits that have not yet adopted a
CVRA mandamus review standard is the highest of the review standard categories. The
Fourth Circuit has denied all 3 reviewed petitions (100%). The Seventh Circuit has denied
both of its reviewed petitions (100%). The First Circuit has not yet reviewed any petitions
included in this analysis. Collectively, the denial rate for the appellate circuits that have
not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard is 100%.432
Looking at the mandamus grant and denial outcomes from another perspective,
the traditional mandamus review standard circuits have actually granted more CVRA
mandamus petitions than the appellate circuits with more expansive review standards, i.e.,
6 vs. 5 granted petitions. It is also important to note the disproportionate impact on the
overall petition success ratios that two circuits-the Fifth and Ninth Circuits-have had.
The Ninth Circuit, a more expansive review standard circuit, has both reviewed and
granted the largest number of CVRA mandamus petitions: granting 5 of the 13 reviewed
petitions. The Fifth Circuit, a traditional review standard circuit, has reviewed and granted
the second largest number of CVRA mandamus petitions: granting 3 of 10 reviewed
petitions. Collectively, these two circuits account for 46% of the reviewed petitions and
73% of the petitions that have been granted.43 3 The comparison of these two circuits and
the successful outcomes overall indicates that a traditional CVRA mandamus review
standard does not foreclose the possibility of the grant of a CVRA petition.
429 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 193-428 and accompanying
text (discussing
CVRA petitions and outcomes).
430 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 48-86 and accompanying
text (discussing the

adoption of more expansive mandamus review standards).

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 90-167 and accompanying text (discussing the
adoption of traditional mandamus review standards).
432 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (discussing the
circuits that have not yet adopted mandamus review standards).
433 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
431

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015

55

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
178

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 5

The above-described data thus reflect that the CVRA mandamus review standard
does not guarantee, or even necessarily predict, a petition's outcome. Circuits that have
adopted more expansive CVRA review standards nevertheless have petition denial rates
ranging between 6 2 -100%. Denial rates for circuits with traditional CVRA mandamus
review standards range from 67 -100%. The denial rate for circuits that have not yet
adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard is 100%.434 These denial rates indicate that
the CVRA mandamus review standard is generally not outcome-determinative.
Another way to assess the impact of the review standard is to examine petitions
that have raised similar issues in circuits with different review standards. For example, the
Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, representing all three review standard categories, have
each denied petitions seeking disclosure of some or all of confidential presentence
reports.43 5 In addition, four circuits have addressed seven petitions brought by one or both
of two petitioners regarding the sexual exploitation of children restitution statute. The
traditional review standard circuits granted 3 of the 4 petitions they reviewed (75%): the
Fifth Circuit granting both of its petitions, the District of Columbia Circuit granting its
petition, and the Eighth Circuit denying its petition. Applying its more expansive review
standard, the Ninth Circuit granted I of the 3 petitions it reviewed (330%).436 Although
there were obviously factual variations in the individual petitions, this review of outcomes
in petitions raising similar issues reflects that the likelihood of CVRA mandamus success
was not enhanced by the availability of a more expansive review standard.
Another measure of the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus review standard
is the fact that, in resolving 10 of the 50 CVRA petitions (20%), appellate courts explicitly
stated that they would have reached the same result regardless whether they applied a
traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard.4 37 In reviewing petitions prior
to adopting their traditional CVRA mandamus review standards, appellate courts in three
circuits took action on four CVRA mandamus petitions based on their determination that
the review standard was not outcome-determinative. The Eleventh Circuit found it
unnecessary to adopt a review standard in denying one petition because it found the issue
for resolution under either review standard was whether the trial court made clearly
erroneous factual findings.43 The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to adopt a review
standard to deny another petition because it concluded that the petitioners had not
established their entitlement to relief under "any potentially applicable standard of
review." 4 3 9 Before denying the petition as moot, the District of Columbia Circuit similarly
found that the petitioner had failed to satisfy either an abuse of discretion or a clear and
indisputable right review standard.44 0 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit found it

434

See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 376-79, 407-22 and accompanying text
(discussing these petitions).

435

436

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 280-327 and accompanying text (discussing these

petitions).
437

See infra notes 438-45 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 52-

56 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding no crime victim right to appeal and finding conversion of attempted appeal into a

mandamus petition would be "futile" because the victim was not entitled to CVRA relief under the traditional or
"more lenient" abuse of discretion standard).
438
See In re Stewart, 641 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2011); supra notes 156-59, 277-79 and accompanying
text (discussing this petition).
439 See In re Aquino, No. 12-11757, slip op. at 2 & n.1 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012); supra notes 159, 219, 401-06
and accompanying text (describing this petition).
440 See In re Jacobsen, No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005); supra notes
138-39, 406 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
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unnecessary to adopt a review standard in granting a petition because it found the
petitioners had established a right to the writ even under the "stricter" traditional review
standard.4 4 1 In addition to these circuits, the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to adopt a
review standard in denying two petitions because it concluded that the petitioners had not
established a right to the writ even under an abuse of discretion standard.44 2
Three additional circuits denied CVRA mandamus petitions in circumstances in
which they explicitly determined that the review standard was not outcome-determinative.
The Ninth Circuit, a more expansive CVRA review standard circuit, denied a petition in
which the petitioner sought mandamus both pursuant to the CVRA and traditional
mandamus authority. The appellate court denied the petition pursuant to "either the CVRA
or our traditional mandamus authority."4 43 The Third Circuit, arguably a more expansive
CVRA review standard circuit, found it unnecessary to determine the applicable review
standard in denying a CVRA writ because it found the petitioner was not entitled to relief
even under the abuse of discretion standard.44 4 In denying two petitions, the Tenth Circuit,
a traditional CVRA review standard circuit, found that the review standard was not
outcome-determinative. In denying one of these petitions, the Tenth Circuit observed that
the review standard did not impact the petition's outcome because it found that the
disputed trial court ruling would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion under either
review standard. 445 In denying the other petition and rejecting the petitioner's request for a
"more relaxed" review standard, the Tenth Circuit noted that the review standard did not
affect the outcome of the petition because relief "must be denied under any standard of
review."

4 46

Of course, among the 50 CVRA petitions, there are some instances in which the
review standard appears to be outcome-impactful, if not outcome-determinative. For
example, in one matter, the Tenth Circuit characterized the petitioners' claim regarding
the trial court's denial of their victim status as a "difficult case." It, however, denied
mandamus because it did not find that the trial court was clearly wrong in its victim status
determination or that the petitioners had established a clear and indisputable right to the
writ, as required under the traditional mandamus review standard.4 47 In another matter, the
Fifth Circuit actually determined that the trial court had erred in its application of the
CVRA and had violated the petitioners' rights to notice and to confer with the prosecutor.
However, the appellate court also considered the petitioners' "substantial and meaningful
participation" at the contested plea proceeding and their opportunity to express their
opposition to the plea agreement before concluding that the grant of mandamus would not
be "appropriate," a dispositive factor included in the traditional mandamus review
standard.448

In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 2009); supra notes 127-30, 343 and accompanying text (discussing
this petition).
442 See In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2008); In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2007);
supra
notes 173-78, 243, 415-22 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions).
44 3
See In re Andrich, 668 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 2011); supra notes 73-78, 213-15 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
444 See In re Zackey, No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914, at *3-4 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010); supra notes
83-86, 393-99 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
445 See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008); supra
notes 98-103, 226 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
446 See In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); supra note 226 (discussing this petition).
447 See In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 2008); supra notes 90-97, 104-10, 223-26 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1126-27 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
448 See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394-96 (5th Cir. 2008); supra notes 112-18, 352-63 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
441
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Although the traditional review standard circuits have applied the clear and
indisputable right requirement to both deny and grant mandamus petitions, 449. its impact on
outcomes has also been diminished by the fact that some appellate courts have
intermingled and blurred the distinctions between adopted CVRA traditional mandamus
review standards and the more expansive abuse of discretion (or legal error) standard
adopted by some circuits. This intermingling of standards is perhaps facilitated by Court
mandamus precedent that recognizes a "clear abuse of discretion" as one of the
"exceptional circumstances" that would justify the "extraordinary remedy" of
mandamus. 4 5 0 For example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, if established, a trial
court's clearly erroneous factual finding regarding CVRA crime victim status would
satisfy the abuse of discretion required under traditional mandamus analysis as well as a
direct appellate review standard. 4 5 1 The Second Circuit concluded that such a clearly
erroneous factual finding concerning CVRA victim status would satisfy its adopted CVRA
abuse of discretion review standard.4 52 The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be reviewing
the trial court's action regarding a discovery request related to CVRA victim status for
abuse of discretion under its traditional mandamus review standard and would have also
done so under the rejected "ordinary appellate" review standard.4 53 Perhaps best reflecting
the intermingling of the adopted CVRA review standards, the Sixth Circuit, a traditional
review standard circuit, found that the petitioner had not established a clear and
indisputable right to the writ and thus concluded that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in finding that the petitioner was not a CVRA crime victim. 4 5 4
As a practical matter, this intermingling or blurring of review standards also
results from the nature of the trial court actions that appellate courts review in many
CVRA petitions. In this connection, most CVRA rights have a "reasonableness" limitation
e.g., the right to "reasonable, accurate, and timely notice," the "reasonable right" to confer
with the prosecutor, and the right to be "reasonably heard." The right of victim-witnesses
not to be excluded from the courtroom is conditioned on a trial court determination that
the testimony of the victim-witnesses would not be materially altered by their presence.
The right to restitution is governed by other statutes that permit, in some instances, a trial
court balancing of the burdens of determining restitution in a complex prosecution against
the victim's need for restitution. The CVRA authorizes "reasonable" alternative
procedures in prosecutions in which the large number of victims makes it "impracticable"

Compare In re Fisher, No. 11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500, at *1-4 (5thCir. Oct. 1, 2011) (finding
no clear and indisputable error in the trial court's determination regarding the petitioners' victim status), with In
re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding clear and indisputable error in trial court's determination
that a time bar prevented its consideration of new arguments regarding the petitioners' CVRA victim status).
450 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); see also supra notes 34-45 and
accompanying text (describing Court mandamus precedent).
451 See In re Stewart, 641 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2011); supra notes 156-59, 278-79 and accompanying
text (discussing this petition).
452 See In re Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing precedent finding that clearly erroneous and
abuse of discretion standards are "indistinguishable" in this context); supra notes 60-65, 209-12 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition).
453 See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008); supra
notes 98-103, 226 and accompanying text (discussing this petition)
454 See In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 348-53 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 136-37, 220 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition); accord In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1236-40 (11th Cir. 2014);
supra notes 160-67, 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
There is a similar intermingling of review standards regarding the legal error component of the Ninth
Circuit's more expansive CVRA review standard. The Ninth Circuit subsequently stated that its analysis in
previous CVRA petitions had focused on whether the trial court's action was "clearly erroneous as a matter of
law," a "dispositive" factor in its traditional mandamus review. See In re Andrich, 668 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.
2011); supra notes 73-78, 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
449
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to accord the enumerated rights to all of the victims. 4 5 5 These provisions consequently
entrust the trial court with a significant degree of discretion in implementing the CVRA.4 56
In fact, in In re W.R. HuffAsset Management Co.,457 the Second Circuit identified

the nature of the CVRA rights and their implementation as support for its selection of a
CVRA abuse of discretion mandamus review standard.45 8
[T]he CVRA provides that the determination to "ensure" that the crime
victim is afforded the rights enumerated in the CVRA is entrusted to
the district court to make. Further, the district court is in a better
position than this Court to decide whether or not relief is warranted
under the CVRA ... as it has far more insight into the complexities of a
pending litigation than does a court of appeals. Most of the rights
provided to crime victims under the CVRA require an assessment of
"reasonableness." The district court is far better positioned to make
these assessments and to determine what constitutes "a reasonable
procedure" for effecting these rights than a court of appeals.45 9
These factors that led the Second Circuit to select a CVRA abuse of discretion review
standard-that it has used to deny all of the CVRA petitions it has reviewed-have also
limited the likelihood that a trial court action regarding the CVRA would be deemed a
clear and indisputable error upon mandamus review under the traditional review standard.
They are also the same factors that have likely limited the scope of mandamus
relief when CVRA petitions have been granted under either the traditional or a more
expansive review standard. For example, when the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits concluded
that the trial courts had erred in their victim status determinations, the appellate courts
nevertheless entrusted the trial courts with the responsibility to subsequently provide the
requested rights by performing the CVRA-required determination regarding victimwitness exclusion from proceedings and by hearing from the victims, respectively.4 60
When the Ninth Circuit determined that the trial court had violated the petitioner's right to
be orally heard at sentencing, it nevertheless required the petitioner to follow the CVRAprescribed procedure of filing a motion to re-open the sentencing in the trial court.46 1
Almost half of the petitions granted involved trial court errors concerning restitution.
Regarding two of these petitions, the Fifth Circuit, a traditional review standard circuit,
dictated what the "correct" restitution award should be.4 62 Regarding the other three

18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a), (d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663, 3663A (West 2000 & Pamp.
2014) (describing restitution provisions).
456 See, e.g., In re Zackey, No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914, at *1-4 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding
that the trial court's action denying the petitioner a right to be heard through his attorney "fell within the proper
exercise of its discretionary powers").
45 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005).
458 Id. at 562-63.
459 Id. (citations omitted).
460 See In re Parker, Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7158, at *3-7 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2009); In
re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008); supra notes 152-55, 216-18, 234-39, 382-84, 400 and
accompanying text (discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 156-59, 278-79 and accompanying text
(discussing denial of Stewart petitioners' subsequent petition regarding denial of restitution).
461 See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2006); supra notes 66-71, 364-75 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf supra notes 376-79 and accompanying text (discussing denial of
Kenna petitioner's subsequent petition regarding access to the presentence report).
462 See In re Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013); In re Amy Unknown, 701
F.3d 749, 773-74 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated andremandedsubnom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710 (2014); supra notes 120-26, 284-301 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions).
455
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petitions, the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits, representing both traditional and
more expansive review standard circuits, authorized the trial courts to attempt to properly
re-determine the restitution award.463
As assessed across multiple measures, the CVRA mandamus review standard,
i.e., a traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard, has had a limited impact
on the outcomes of CVRA mandamus petitions in the ten years since the statute's
enactment. The appellate circuits have denied the majority (from 62 -100%) of the
mandamus petitions, regardless of the review standard. Appellate circuits with traditional
mandamus review standards have actually granted more CVRA petitions than those with
more expansive review standards. The review standard has not differentially impacted the
outcomes in petitions resolving similar issues. In a significant minority of the petition
opinions, the appellate courts explicitly stated that the same outcome would have been
reached regardless which review standard was utilized. Several other appellate courts have
intermingled or blurred the distinctions between the review standards in resolving their
petitions. Finally, both in granting and denying the presented CVRA petitions, regardless
of the review standard used, appellate courts have shown significant deference to trial
courts' implementation of the CVRA and its required "reasonableness" and other
determinations.464
V.

CONCLUSION

When Congress considered the enactment of the CVRA in 2004, one of its
primary sponsors identified its mandamus enforcement remedy as a feature that made the
legislation "so important, and different from earlier legislation" and a remedy that would
allow an "appellate court to take timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule
of laws set out in this statute." 46 5 In the ten years since the CVRA's enactment, federal
appellate courts have considered 73 mandamus petitions asserting violations of the
CVRA. In the course of their review of these petitions, the appellate circuits have
addressed most of the crime victim rights prescribed in the CVRA and other aspects of the
statute, including the definition of crime victim status for purposes of CVRA eligibility.

See In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Amy & Vicky, 710 F.3d 985,
987 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2011); supra notes 140-46, 261-66, 302-08, 31823 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text
(discussing denial of Amy and Vicky's subsequent petition regarding the award of restitution).
The scope of relief ordered upon granting the remaining CVRA mandamus petitions was also limited,
regardless of the review standard utilized. See In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring the trial
court to hear new arguments regarding the petitioners' victim status); In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800, 801 (6th Cir.
2009) (requiring the trial court to rule on the petitioner's motion within two weeks); In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d 1137,
1139-40 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring the trial court to make the CVRA-prescribed determination regarding victimwitness exclusion from proceedings); supra notes 127-30, 228-33, 343, 385-92 and accompanying text
(discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text (discussing denial of Allen
petitioners' subsequent petition regarding restitution).
The breadth of the appellate circuit's mandamus review standard also has not predicted which circuits are
most likely to broadly interpret the scope of the CVRA itself For example, the Ninth Circuit, a more expansive
review standard circuit, more broadly interpreted the CVRA rights to be heard and not to be excluded from court
proceedings. See Mikhel, 453 F.3d at 1139; Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. However, the Fifth Circuit, a traditional
review standard circuit, more broadly interpreted the CVRA right to confer with the prosecutor and the sexual
exploitation of children restitution statute. See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 773; In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394-95
(5th Cir. 2008).
464 See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the CVRA review standard).
465 See 150 CONG. REc. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
463
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The appellate courts have granted 11 of these mandamus petitions and denied 62
petitions.466
In their CVRA mandamus review, a conflict has developed among the circuits
regarding the appropriate review standard to be utilized. The initial appellate circuits to
identify a CVRA mandamus review standard adopted standards that were more expansive
than traditional mandamus review standards: an abuse of discretion standard in the Second
Circuit and an abuse of discretion or legal error standard in the Ninth Circuit. The circuits
that have subsequently adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard have adopted some
version of a traditional mandamus review standard, with all incorporating a requirement of
a petitioner showing of a clear and indisputable right to the writ. These circuits include the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. The Third
Circuit's review standard is ambiguous in that it has referred both to the more expansive
standards adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits and the traditional standard. The First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard. 467
This conflict in the circuits regarding the review standard can be resolved by
either congressional or Court action. In this connection, legislation was recently
introduced, but not enacted, in both the Senate and House of Representatives to amend the
CVRA to reflect that appellate courts "shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review"
in deciding CVRA mandamus petitions.468 Alternatively, the Court could grant certiorari
review to resolve the conflict among the circuits, as it did regarding the child sexual
exploitation restitution statute in the Paroline decision, 4 6 9 and determine whether the
CVRA requires a traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard.
The mandamus remedy is an important component of the CVRA. To achieve the
most effective implementation of the CVRA, the circuit conflict regarding the mandamus
review standard should be resolved-regardless of the review standard selected. As a
practical matter, however, this Article has demonstrated that the difference in review
standards has had a limited impact on the outcomes of the CVRA mandamus petitions
reviewed thus far. It is therefore unlikely that a resolution of the circuit conflict regarding

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 193-428 and accompanying text (identifying and
discussing these petitions).
467 See supra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA
mandamus review standard).
468 S. 2646, 113th Cong. § 302 (2014); H.R. 4165, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); S. 822, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). This
provision was added, during Judiciary Committee consideration, to proposed Senate legislation reauthorizing the
Justice for All Act and including some amendments to the CVRA. The bill was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. No further action was taken on the CVRA amendments
prior to the expiration of the congressional session. All Actions: S 822
113th Congress (2013-2014),
CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/822/all-actions (last visited Jan. 7,
2015). This provision was also added, during Judiciary Committee review, to proposed Senate legislation
addressing runaway and homeless youth and trafficking prevention. The bill was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. No further action was taken prior to the expiration of
the congressional session. All Actions: S 2646
113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2646/all-actions (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). The
provision was in legislation introduced in the House of Representatives containing proposed amendments to the
CVRA and other crime victim-related legislation. It was referred for subcommittee consideration, but no action
was taken prior to the expiration of the congressional session. All Actions: H.R. 4165 113th Congress (20132014), CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4165/all-actions (last visited
Jan. 7, 2015).
469 See supra notes 328-36 and accompanying text (discussing
the Paroline decision).
466
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the review standard will significantly change the outcomes of CVRA mandamus petitions
in the future.47 0

See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus
review standard on petition outcomes).
470
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POSTSCRIPT: OUT OF THE MANDAMUS MUDDLE

After completion of this Article, both the Senate and House of Representatives
approved an amendment to the CVRA to resolve the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA
mandamus review standard.47 1 In separate legislation approved regarding other matters,
both chambers included a provision that explicitly states that the appellate courts "shall
apply ordinary standards of appellate review" in deciding CVRA mandamus petitions.4 72
Prior to the publication of this Article, the House of Representatives adopted the Senate
version of the broader legislation containing the CVRA mandamus review standard
amendment previously approved in both chambers.4 73 President Barack Obama signed the
legislation into law on May 29, 2015.474 This CVRA amendment resolves the circuit
conflict regarding the mandamus review standard that has existed throughout the first ten
years of the CVRA implementation and it will provide appellate courts greater guidance in
considering CVRA mandamus petitions in the future.4 7 5 However, as this Article has
demonstrated, the resolution of the circuit conflict regarding the mandamus review

471 See S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015); 161 CONG. REC. S2,338 (daily ed.
Apr. 22, 2015) (reflecting passage of the legislation); 161 CONG. REC. H607 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2015) (reflecting
passage of the legislation); see also All Actions: S. 178
114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 14th-congress/senate-bill/178/all-actions (last visited June 6, 2015); AllActions:
H.R. 181 114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/181/all-actions (last visited May 21, 2015); cf supra note 468 and accompanying text (describing previous
legislative proposals to resolve the mandamus review standard issue).
47 2
S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015). Both the Senate and House of
Representatives included this CVRA amendment in legislation addressing victims of trafficking. In this
legislation, both chambers also approved additional CVRA amendments, such as 1) the addition of CVRA rights
to timely information about plea bargains and deferred prosecution agreements and to information about the
CVRA rights themselves and 2) a provision to permit the mandamus litigants and the appellate court to agree to a
different time period for mandamus resolution than the 72 hour time period established in the CVRA. S. 178,
114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015); AllActions: S 178, supra note 471; AllActions:
H.R. 181, supra note 471.
473 See 161 CONG. REC. H3,329-30 (daily ed. May 19, 2015) (reflecting passage of the legislation); AllActions:
S. 178, supra note 471.
474 See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 113; AllActions: S. 178, supra note
471.
47 Although intended to resolve the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA mandamus review standard, the review
standard Congress has selected may not be entirely clear. The amendment provides for the use of "ordinary
standards of appellate review" in CVRA mandamus proceedings. S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015). Traditional
appellate review standards include de novo review of questions of law, clear error review of questions of fact,
and abuse of discretion review of matters entrusted to the trial court's discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 558 (1988); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005). The only discussion
of the proposed legislative clarification of the CVRA mandamus review standard appears in the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary report:

This section adopts the approach followed by the Ninth Circuit in Kenna v. U.S. District
Courtfor the CentralDistrictof California,435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006), and the Second
Circuit in In re WR. HuffAsset Management Company, 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005),
namely that, despite the use of a writ of mandamus as a mechanism for victims' rights
enforcement, Congress intended that such writs be reviewed under ordinary appellate
review standards.
H.R. REP. No. 114-7, at 8 (2015). As described in this Article, the Second Circuit adopted an abuse of discretion
mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions in WR. HuffAsset Management Co., 409 F.3d at 562-63, and
the Ninth Circuit adopted an abuse of discretion or legal error mandamus review standard in Kenna, 435 F.3d at
1017. See supra notes 48-59, 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA mandamus review standards
established in these decisions). Although similar, these two review standards are not identical and they do not
include all of the traditional appellate review standards. Thus, even after the enactment of this CVRA
amendment, there may be some continuing questions about the applicable CVRA mandamus review standard.
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standard is not likely to significantly change the outcomes of CVRA mandamus
petitions.476

See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus
review standard on the petition outcomes).
476
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